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Preface 
The chapters following present an approach of tool use from a perceptual point of view. 
The ability of young children to solve tool use tasks was investigated in order to 
identify the perceptual capacities that mark the shift from pre-tool use to tool use 
behaviour. The theoretical framework for this research is ecological realism as founded 
by J.J. Gibson. 
It might come as a surprise for those who believe the mind to be a set of independent 
faculties, or modules, that tool use can be studied in a framework hitherto reserved for 
perception. If, however, human beings are viewed as developing organisms, in which 
action and perception capacities might develop in synthesis, one might discover close 
correspondences between the perceptual and action planning capacities. 
For theories like Gibson's, the study of complex actions like tool use has not been the 
focus of attention. Primarily, Gibsonian realism has dealt with immediate perception-
action couplings like posture maintenance and spatial orientation. However, complex 
actions need not, and should not be excluded from this approach. 
In Chapter 1, the concepts of ecological realism are analyzed for their merits and 
shortcomings for the study of tool use. Where necessary, the approach is extended 
with new assumptions. In Chapter 2, from these a description of complex action in 
terms of nested actor-environment relationships is introduced. Two sources of 
complexity are assumed that affect the difficulty of perceiving the function of a tool. 
Experimental predictions regarding the difficulty of a tool use task are put to a test. In 
Chapter 3, the role of perceptual complexity in the development of tool use is studied. 
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Towards an Ecological Account of Tool Use 
Lieselotte van Leeuwen 
University of Nijmegen 
and 
Cees van Leeuwen 
University of Amsterdam 
Introduction 
In search of the roots of intelligence, we are led to the ability to usi and make tools. 
Humankind is distinguished from other primates by the extent and vlriety of tool use. 
For archeologists, prehistorical tools are an important source of infolnation about the 
capacities of their makers. From a psychological point of view, however, it is hardly 
known what capacities exactly are needed to use and make tools. Studies in which 
attention is paid to tool use as distinctive category of behaviour have been performed 
with primates by Wolfgang Köhler (1917). These experiments havabeen replicated 
with young children (e.g. Richardson, 1932). But these early studi« have not been 
able to preclude that today, tool use is a field relatively neglected by pslchologists. 
A renewed psychological interest in tool use seems however to onerge from the 
ecological approach to psychology (Gibson, 1979; Reed, 1982; Noble, 1981). This 
approach takes the organism environment relationship as the starting point of 
investigation. In two complementary senses, tools embody a way of organisms 
adapting to their environment. An organism uses tools to make the environmental 
resources serve its needs. But also, the tool manifests the way in which the organism 
must tailor itself to environmental conditions. 
The study of tool use diverges from the usual applications of ecological realism. It has 
dealt mostly with immediate perception action couplings, like posture maintenance and 
spatial orientation. The study of tool use necessitates us to deal with issues in which the 
organism realizes its needs not immediately, but by using environmental resources as 
means to an end. Because tool use in this sense is mediated action, in order to apply 
Gibsonian concepts some basic assumptions must be made which touch the 
foundations of this approach. These will be the subject of our present contribution. 
The basic assumptions of ecological realism are already manifest in its name. Its 
concepts are embedded both in realism, by virtue of ascribing objective existence to 
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higher order perceivable invariants, and in ecology, by virtue of the belief that these 
concepts are to be defined in reference to the organism. This relationalism in the 
Gibsonian approach has been argued to be contradictory to its realism. As will be 
shown, the fact that the environment in tool use circumstances is not just found as a 
fixed entity, but also made by organisms, forces the issue. Confronted with the choice 
to give up either realism or relationalism, we chose in favour of the latter. This, because 
it is this assumption which in our view distinguishes Gibson from other, mentalist, 
conceptions of perception and action. We shall discuss the consequences of this step 
for the issues most relevant for the study of tool use from the perspective of ecological 
realism, viz. event perception and intentionality. 
Relationalism vs. mentalism 
In a mentalist api roach to perception two distinct worlds are assumed: one outside the 
individual and fie other inside. Strict borders separate these worlds, and each is 
described by ія own exclusive set of properties, physical and mental ones, 
respectively. Physical states of affairs are regarded as meaningless; meaning is the 
realm of the inside world, to be described in terms of mental representations. Insofar as 
these are of perceptual origin, they are constructed from the meaningless sensory input 
by means of inlmnation processes. Because the physical world is the source of the 
energy that fallilon the sensory receptors, there must be a stage at which the transition 
from physical t | mental, from the meaningless to the meaningful, is made. Therefore, 
earlier, physica. stages in the process are distinguished from later, mental ones. The 
former are called sensations and the latter perceptions. Fodor (1980) argues that the 
perceptual representations of the outside world have relations among themselves that 
could be understood without reference to the external world. A formal, syntactic theory 
of these representations could have an explanatory role for behaviour. 
According to Gibson (1950; 1979) such a view is problematic, because of the cleft that 
separates sensation and perception. Its consequence is that meaning is the product of 
the mind. He wonders "If the solid visual world is a contribution of the mind, if the 
mind constructs the world for itself, where do the data for this construction come from, 
and why does it agree so well with the environment in which we actually move and get 
about'XGibson, 1950, p. 13). 
Gibson and those who follow his footsteps consider psychology as the study of "mind-
world" relationships. But mind and world are redescribed in order no longer to be 
separate entities. The mind is part of the material world and its functioning can be 
understood only as situated within that world. It therefore comes as no surprise that 
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Gibson rejects the dichotomy between sensation and perception. Perception is not 
construction of meaning; meaning itself is determined by the physical structures in the 
environment. 
In Gibson's terms, "perceiving is an achievement of the individual, not an appearance 
in the theatre of consciousness. It is a keeping-in-touch with the world, an experience 
of things rather than a having of experiences. It involves awareness-of instead of just 
awareness. It may be awareness of something in the environment, of something in the 
observer or both at once, but there is no content of awareness independent of that 
which one is aware (...) perception is not a mental act. Neither is it a bodily act. 
Perceiving is a psychosomatic act, not of mind or of body but of a living observer" 
(Gibson,1979, pp.239-240). 
Therefore instead of mind and world, the interaction is described with preference by 
Gibson as one between organism and environment. The way these are described 
crosscuts the traditional boundaries between meaningless physical and meaningful 
mental states. Meaningful action is seen as changing the mutual relationship between an 
organism and his environment. Perception guides and controls action. 
In order to specify how perception and environment are related, Gibson (1979) 
launches a program for redescribing the world of physics. Instead of descriptions of 
how light, or other forms of energy radiate from a single source, the focus is on the 
pattern of energy that radiates from several sources and is reflected by various surfaces. 
This pattern contains invariants that depend in a lawful way on changes within the 
environment. Invariants across transformations of the optic array specify texture and 
surface properties of objects in the world, including the organism itself or others. 
Some of these invariants are relevant to a perceiver's behavior. These are called 
affordances. "The affordances of the environment are what it offers the animal, what it 
provides or furnishes, either for good or ill" (Gibson, 1979, p.127). Thus affordances 
are assumed to exist objectively in the structured array of ambient light. "The 
affordance of something does not change as the need of the observer changes" 
(Gibson, 1979, pp.138-139). 
At the same time, affordances are specified as potential complementary relations 
between an organism and its environment. By consequence, affordances consist of 
body scaled information. Height of an object is specified in units according to 
perceiver's eyeheight. Thus action, viewed as the realization of affordances, is 
intimately related to perception: the affordances perceived have their counterparts in 
effectivities of the organism. Effectivities are the biomechanica! characteristics of a 
body that allow certain actions. The body-scaled information is determined in relation to 
an effectivity. For instance, an affordance of an object could be "ability to be grasped". 
With respect to distance, body scaled here means that the distance is measured in units 
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of the perceiver's arm length, and size is measured relatively to the proportions of the 
hand. Other, well-known examples for criteria specifying a perceptual invariant relation 
between organism and environment are Lee & Reddish's (1981) study on plummeting 
gannets or Warren's (1984) investigation of stairclimbing. 
Understanding perception within this framework implies to understand how action 
arises as a dynamic interplay between structural properties of an organism and those of 
the environment the organism is part of. The promise of such a research program lies 
exactly in breaking the boundaries of dualism in the mentalist way isolating the inner 
from the outer world. 
Realism vs. relationalism 
As has been recently noticed even in the community of ecological realists, there exists a 
tension in Gibson's work between his attempt to provide an alternative to the mentalist 
approach to perception in terms of a relational framework and the claim of realism. 
Some view this as only an apparent contradiction (Ben-Zeev, 1984; Heft, 1989; Noble, 
1981), others as a sign of a fundamental one (Costali, 1986). 
Ben-Zeev (1984) argues that whether afTordances are to be characterized as objective or 
relational is a matter of levels of description. Affordances should be viewed as 
relational in a context in which a third person reasons about the world of appearence, 
and e.g. compares its ecological description to a physical one. For a first person, within 
a certain environment, however, an affordance may have a non-relational, independent 
existence as potentiality: "The affordances are always there to be perceived. The actual 
perceiver may or may not attend to affordances which, in principle, he has the capacity 
to perceive"(p.77). 
According to Heft (1989), it is possible also within an environment, to reconcile the 
realism with the relationalism by distinguishing between actual and potential. 
Affordances are to be viewed as dispositional properties of environmental features 
scaled in reference to the action capacities of an animal. Whereas objectivity exists in 
specification of what is available to perception; its relational character is manifested in 
what is actually perceived within a certain situation. 
Both authors agree that potentiality goes together with objectivity. It might seem that 
this aspect of the reconciliation of realism and relationalism applies without manifest 
contradictions to the study of tool use. A hammer, for instance has a variety of 
potentialities; it can afford hammering with but it could also, in principle be perceived 
as a lever or a means for reaching. The objective existence of the invariants that allow 
the detection of the tool function, the tool-affordances, could exist independently of 
whether in a situation they are actually perceived. What is actually perceived is 
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controlled by the needs of an organism (Gibson, 1975). These needs guide perception 
towards those environmental properties that may serve to fulfil it 
However, the contradiction between the objective and the relational character of 
affordances may become fundamental, if we stop taking the merely potential and the 
actualized character of affordances as isolated points in time. Costali (1986) attributes 
this insight to the American functionalists (Dewey, 1898/1976) in their combat against 
the "psychologist's fallacy". What a situation affords depends on the realizations of 
some earlier affordances; these may have changed the world and what it presently 
affords. In the unfolding of action the environment changes concurrently. Airplanes 
afford flying; they have been set into the world for this purpose. Before, there were, 
for humans, no affordances related to the act of flying. This implies that the ecological 
environment cannot be seen as a fixed entity with a fully determinate meaning. Instead, 
a genetic perspective on affordances is needed. 
The realism that requires a predetermined fixed world on which individuals can act 
would make out of actors merely 'finders' of what already exists. A relational 
approach instead could treat them as 'makers' of their circumstances (Shorter, 1983). In 
human development, it is essential to describe how individuals evolve from 'Anders' to 
'makers' of their own situation. Costali (1986) therefore sees relationalism as the only 
way to deploy a genetic perspective of human perception and action. Actions are 
facilitated and constrained by environmental circumstances. These are created or 
modified by the agents. Tool use is a clear example for acting organisms as both 
'Anders' and 'makers'. Tools change the mechanical and/or perceptual capabilities of 
their users. They are used and produced in order to change objects or situations with 
respect to the needs of their users. 
Tools themselves can both be "found" and "made". A stone used for breaking a nut is a 
'found' tool. So is a stick, just picked up and used for termite fishing. At the moment a 
branch is broken off from a tree to be used as a stick, the tool could be regarded as 
'made'. What is 'found' in this case are the properties of a branch as a potential stick. 
This includes the affordance of the branch to be capable of being broken off. Starting 
from these 'found' properties, the stick can be 'made' a tool. 
A large variety of animals (fishes, monkeys, apes) use 'found' tools. Tool making is 
less widespread in animals, but known to occur also (Beck, 1980). Köhler (1917) 
reports how chimpanzees connected two sticks to build a new one, long enough to 
obtain the banana. This may illustrate that a genetic perspective on tool use might be 
useful also on an evolutionary time scale. 
The same might apply to an anthropological study of tool use. People in a western 
society grow up in an environment full of very sophisticated and highly specific tool-
objects. Under these circumstances, there is little need e.g. for children to make tools 
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since for nearly all possible means specific tool-objects are available, starting from a 
spoon up to computers. In contrast, children growing up for instance in the countryside 
of Africa are confronted with what might be called the more "natural" world, one with 
much less objects ready for being used as tools. Since tools must be made on the basis 
of what is found, these children have to develop the capacity to detect properties that 
afford the making of a tool, in addition to those that afford its bare use. These children 
are forced to be 'makers' in their environment, hor шышие, three-year old children 
there are able to build well functioning birdsnares (Wemer, 1953, p. 19). 
In an ontogenetic perspective, the child usually first learns to use whatever 
environmental resources are found. Tool use, as mediated action, is a step towards 
increasing the action radius of the child. In our view, the first step is the use of found 
tools. Tool making, starting from whatever is found, is the next step in development 
The examples mentioned may show how 'finding' and 'making' are interdependent 
parts of the organism-environment interaction. Although affordances (of e.g. tools) 
could be regaided as 'found' only, this usually is not the whole story. For the study of 
tool use, we therefore need a genetic perspective, in which affordances are understood 
relationally. 
Perceiving information for affordances 
The consequence of adopting a relational account of perception is, that whatever 
information facilitates an action, specifies an affordance. This, because the objectivity 
criterion for affordances, that an affordance is fully specified by the invariances in the 
world, no longer can be used. Ecological specification has no other criterion than the 
corresponding action. Information as invariants from physical or geometrical properties 
in the world is not denied, its exclusiveness as a source for action however is. The 
information that specifies an affordance must be compatible with the invariants in the 
world. But a stronger relationship between invariants and information is no longer the 
rule. 
In the literature on affordances, it is generally assumed that affordances are to be 
distinguished from the information for affordances (body-scaled information). "For 
example, a surface at a particular height may afford stepping-up on, and this property is 
specified by information; but it is the surface, not the information, that affords this 
action" (anonymous review). Affordances are 1:1 relationships between organismic 
and environmental structures. Information, in general is viewed as invariant of the 
objective world. The descriprion of these invariances, however, is scaled in reference to 
the body of the perceiver. For instance, the height of an object is specified in units of 
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the perceiver's eyeheight. (body-scaled information). Specifically, information for 
affordances is a 1:1 relationship between exteroception and proprioception. We 
maintain these distincions in our definitions. However, the implication usually 
associated with these notions, viz. that there is also a 1:1 relationship between 
exteroception and environmental structures as well as a 1:1 relationship between 
proprioceptive and organismic structures is herewith denied. Information must specify 
an affoidance insofar as sufficient to act, but needn't determine it uniquely. 
To illustrate the obsoleteness of unique specification of an affoidance by information, 
envisage a frog capable of feeding itself by snapping at flies which it can visually 
detect. Surely, the ecological information for the frog consists of certain invariants 
based on physical energy patterns. But it is irrelevant whether the affordance 
corresponds to one physical energy pattern, uniquely characteristic of edible insects. It 
is sufficient that the affordance be reliable in most cases (not too many misses and false 
alarms), and it is necessary that the frog makes not too many dangerous misses and 
false alarms (e.g. snapping at a wasp). This shows that a unique state of affairs as such 
is neither sufficient, nor necessary, because what is really sufficient depends on the 
specific environment as a whole. If for instance a new species of insects would enter 
this environment that share the invariants of the edible ones but is dangerous, finer 
distinctions have to be made. Accordingly, the ecological information that specifies 
edible insects sufficiently, changes. Thus, focussing on the relation between organism 
and environment doesn't mean a reintroduction of subjective, mental representation but 
to the study of affordances in an adaptive or evolutionary perspective. 
Body-scaled and object-scaled information 
In the case of tool use, body-scaled information is not enough to specify the affordance 
of a tool. A stick can be used for obtaining an object because it cannot be reached. In 
this case, the absence, rather than the presence of the affordance "reachability" makes a 
tool out of the stick. The tool can 'effectuate' the reaching on the basis of properties 
complementary to those of the target. Thus object-scaled information is used to 
compensate the actor's lacking effectivity to reach directly. This object-scaled 
information in turn must be scaled to the actors body because he has to handle the tool. 
A stick which is long enough to reach the target but too heavy is useless. Affording to 
be a tool thus requires both, object-scaled information and body-scaled information. 
The interrelationship between object-scaled and body-scaled information could specify 
a higher-order affordance. It qualifies as an affordance, because the interrelation is 
body scaled information useful for realizing the goal of an action. 
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There is empirical evidence that object-scaled information is detected early in perceptual 
development in humans. For instance the relative size of two shapes which specify a 
containment relationship is reacted to by nine month's old children in habituation 
studies (Sitskoom, 1991). That objects are scaled in reference to each other doesn't 
exclude the possibility that the whole scene can at the same time be scaled in reference 
to the perceiver's body. In order to actively put a small object into a container, the 
graspability of the object must be taken in account in order to act successfully. The 
organism's effectivities no longer have a special status as it comes to specifying what 
enables an organism to act; object-scaled information as well as body-scaled 
information are required for action. 
Tools are always both body-scaled and object-scaled. For example, the screwdriver is 
object-scaled with respect to the screw. Its handle, however, is body-scaled to the 
user's hand and the required movement. Actions with tools must therefore be 
understood as based on the integration of object-scaled and body-scaled information. 
Ecological realism so far has not been able to provide an appropriate treatment of these 
cases. Object-scaled information has been investigated as a perceivable invariant, but 
not as something the perceiver acts upon. For example, by using a technique based on 
Johansson (1975), Cutting, Proffitt & Kozlowski (1978) found that subjects correctly 
identified the sex of a person walking in the dark, with only a light bulb attached to the 
shoulder, and one to the hip. The centre of moment was the invariant which perceivers 
used for the identification, the cross section of an imaginary line drawn between the 
trajectories of the two moving light bulbs. Its position relative to the hip and shoulder 
was sufficient for making the required distinction. 
Insofar as actions involving tool-like instruments such as tabletennis rackets have been 
studied, they are treated as mere effectivities, as if they were bodily parts (Bootsma & 
van Wieringen, 1990). Such an approach could be maintained as long as the selection 
of an object for the sake of its tool function is not the subject of investigation. But as 
soon as the issue becomes how someone could recognize a racket as a means for 
playing table tennis, the combination of body scaled with object scaled information 
becomes the matter of interest. 
Events and object-scaled information 
Object-scaled infomiation has been studied in ecological realism under the heading of 
event perception. The role of the organism within an event, however, has been entirely 
viewed as that of observer, not as that of an active participant. As we shall argue, if the 
distinction between what is relevant in action and what is relevant in corresponding 
event perception could be overcome, we may claim that determinants of event 
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perception should also be relevant if the observer himself becomes an active participant 
in the event 
In order to apply the notions developed in the context of event perception to tool use, 
they will have to be purged from their objectivist connotations first This means taking 
seriously Gibson's proposition that "Ecological events, as distinguished from 
microphysical and astronomical events occur at the level of substances and 
surfaces"(Gibson, 1979, p.93). Events are characterized in terms of changes in the 
optic array. Three kinds of change are characteristic of events: changes in the layout of 
surfaces, changes in the colour and texture of surfaces and changes in the existence of 
surfaces. Because the mechanical tools used in psychological experiments with children 
typically cause changes in layout of surfaces, we will restrict the further discussion to 
this type of event 
It is undeniable that changes of layout are always mechanical events caused by forces. 
They are perceptually available through motion. Motion is detectable, because it brings 
about changes in the optical array. In optical terms, the reflections from illuminated 
objects in their complex patterns of interference shape the optical array. In geometrical 
terms, the positions of the objects known through their Cartesian coordinates in space 
detennine their location in the optical array. These were assumed to be a specification of 
something. However, the exact physical or geometrical nature of these specifications 
was already considered irrelevant to the description of the optic array in perception by 
Gibson (1979). Regarding optics: "The two kinds of "motion", physical and optical 
have nothing in common and probably should not even have the same term applied to 
them. The beginning and the end of the disturbance in the light correspond to the 
beginning and the end of the event in the world, but that is about as far as the 
correspondence goes" (p. 103), and regarding geometry: "The displacements and turns 
of detached objects can be classed as changes of layout because they are rearrangements 
of the furniture of the earth, not pure translations and rotations along and around the 
three axes of Cartesian coordinate space" (p.97). 
Thus, by assuming a connection with physics, but opting out as a specification of this 
connection, the ecological description of the world is reducible in principle, but not 
reducible effectively to a physics description. This already comes very close to our 
claim that the Gibsonian specificity is redundant and therefore the physical description 
of the event should be treated as a constraint instead. 
Important characteristics of events, such as causality, could already be reliably be 
detected with very impoverished stimuli, provided that some essential properties of 
these are preserved (Johansson, 1975; Michotte & Thinès, 1963/1991). It is of 
importance that these essentials in the organism-environment relation are described 
without having to depend on their physical structure. By this, the level of ecological 
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description of the environment becomes a species of phenomenology. Such a 
phenomenological analysis has two necessary ingredients, it must be able to specify the 
units of the domain under analysis and what relations they may enter. 
Units 
Those units must be indicated within the ecological field of the event, which are 
sufficiently specific to enable an action. Action can be described as "that aspect of 
human activity in which people make a difference in their environments" (Shotter, 
1983, p. 32). Correspondingly, units of an event can be signified by discontinuities in 
the flowfield. Discontinuity in the stream of information principally indicates the 
structural distinction between events or episodes within an event. As Gibson 1979 
argues, "rupture occurs when the continuity fails, and this is a highly significant 
ecological event...The maximum of disruption can be thought of as disintegration" 
(p. 102). So our assumption that the units of events are signified by discontinuities in 
the flowfield is in accordance with Gibsonian thought. 
But, according to Gibson, what units are assumed in perception depends on the 
situation. "What we take to be a unitary episode is (...) a matter of choice and depends 
on the beginning and the end that are appropriate, not on the units of 
measurement"(Gibson, 1979, p.101). If e.g. the perceiver's goal is to differentiate 
between a walking or a standing person, stretching-relaxing can be seen as a unitary 
event, not a sequence of events. A repetition of this event characterizes walking. In the 
context of the perceiver's task no more detailed specification in terms of sub-events is 
needed. By contrast, in e.g. ball kicking, the precise amplitude of stretching is of 
importance. Therefore the unitary events should be the stretching episode as distinct 
from the relaxation one. A consequence of Gibson's claims about the situation-specific 
determination of units of an event is, that not a discontinuity as such indicates the 
borders of a unit, but the for an action in a certain situation relevant discontinuities. 
Units are determined on the one hand from the perceivable discontinuities in the 
flowfield and on the other hand on the relevance of those discontinuities for an actor. 
Michotte's phenomenology of causality 
Michotte & Thinès (1963/1991) studied the structure of discontinuities in the stream of 
infonnation as the basis for perceiving causality. In their approach, the perception of 
causal relations is taken as a phenomenon in its own right. Mechanical events like 
launching are investigated as ecological events, not just as sequences of displacements. 
Causal relations "include, in the usual sense of the word, the 'production' of a change 
by a preceding event, as for example, the reddening of an iron bar after heating, the 
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displacement of a body after an impact, the various changes resulting from the motor 
activities of man and animals, such as pushes, pulls, compressions, launching etc" 
(p.66). 
Michotte showed that causality was perceived in kinetic events on the basis of specific 
perceptual, rather than kinetic conditions on the configurations. These conditions were 
identified for perceiving the displacement of an object as caused by another: a form of 
transference of perceived motion that Michotte called ampliation. Entraining and 
launching are forms of ampliation. They produce the impression of causality regardless 
of real collision between the objects in the configurations presented. 
The perceptual invariants that specify ampliation of movement are present in most of the 
mechanical and biomechanica! changes occurring around us including our own bodies. 
"The conditions of formation of these structures are fulfilled at almost every moment of 
life, either after changes in the external environment or after the continuous movements 
of our body, of our limbs, and principally during all our manual activities" (Michotte et 
al., 1963/1991). 
Michotte emphasised that the perception of those causal relations forms the basis for 
our understanding of events that we observe as well as of those we produce. "It is 
hardly necessary to stress that causal relations are essential to our knowledge of the 
world, since they seem to provide valid explanations of the changes that occur both 
around and inside us. Moreover, they allow us both to predict the occurrence of certain 
events and ultimately to control or adapt to them"(Michotte et al., 1963/1991, p.66). 
In sum, discontinuities in the stream of information may qualify as units at a level that 
is relevant for acting successfully. That the relevance of certain units changes with the 
perceiver's purpose or skill and that therefore, they have to be identified relationally is 
in accordance with our view that there is no objective characterization of affordances. 
Hierarchical relations between units 
If ecological events are to specify the invariants of a tool, we must be able to indicate 
their distinctive phenomenal characteristics. Michotte, 1951/1991 studied the general 
characteristics of the so called "tool effect". In his experiments, he used e.g. an object 
which launched another one, and this one in tum launched a third object We thus have 
a chain of discontinuities of the type which may qualify as the units of the events. An 
intermediary becomes activated by a "motor" and acts only because of that. Subjects 
attributed distinctive phenomenal qualities to the causal powers of the initial and the 
intermediary mover. "The intervention of the intermediary appears to be purely passive 
and dependent on the action of the motor object with which it is integrated as a 
constituent part; it is this which gives it a characteristic phenomenal aspect"(p.98). 
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Michette thus could give an affuinative answer to the question whether "...the hammer 
manipulated by the user gives us a direct impression of being an intermediary, that is a 
means of execution, which is itself devoid of any initiative"(p.88). 
The impression of an object as intermediary and passive depended on speed of motion 
and distance covered. With decreasing speed or increasing distance, the impression 
became weaker or disappeared. The intermediary object is then no longer perceived as 
passive but as self acting. Michette describes the difference in impression as akin to 
"watching a billiard player launching a ball against another, which happens to be close 
enough that it could be grasped in the fingers (e.g., 1 or 2 cm away)" versus 
"observing a skittles game, where the ball travels a long distance before reaching the 
'target"'(p.91). In the latter case the intermediary object is not longer seen as passive 
but becomes itself an agent of transmission. This may illustrate that the impression is 
constrained by the physical time structure. 
Constrained, but not determined. The 'tool effect' is a phenomenon in its own right, 
not reducible to the physical properties of the discontinuities, like launchings, in 
isolation. This, because it is not their mere sequence that yields the phenomenal 
impression of an intermediate, but their manifestation as a hierarchically organized time 
structure, "...under certain conditions, the entire causal chain, as well as its internal 
dynamic hierarchy, is manifest (i.e., the exclusive activity of the motor object). In these 
cases the tool effect is an immediate datum, which is complete and open to 
view"(p.l01). 
Any event of some complexity will be interpreted in terms of interrelated cause-effect 
sequences. The causal structure of an event has got to be understood by imposing a 
hierarchy onto the causal chain induced by the units. Means-end relations may illustrate 
this, and specifically those including tools. No object properties in isolation make an 
object a means to an end; no properties in isolation make a tool out of an object. If a 
person picks up an object, takes it into his car and drives home with it, all this doesn't 
reveal the tool function of the object. But if once at home, he attempts to drive a nail 
into a wall by means of the object. The whole causal chain of events could be seen in 
retrospect as one unitary event involving tool use, viz. driving home in order to do a 
job. This illustrates that there is hierarchical structuring involved in the perception of 
tool function. 
Action as event 
Action can be regarded as the production of an event. The perceiving organism is 
involved, not merely as 'observer' but as 'maker' as well. Intentional action is 
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producing an event, of which the final state was the desired outcome in the beginning. 
Thus intentional action requires the detection of the appropriate units of the event that 
allow control over the realization of the desired event outcome before and/or during the 
action. The units will therefore have to meet the constraints of physical reality. 
Michotte sees a difference between observing a tool effect passively in an event and the 
case in which someone is involved in the event as the user of the tool. Here beside 
visual information, the tactile-kinesthetic information is a primary source. Michotte 
argues that the impressions of these senses are governed by the same structural laws as 
the visual ones. "These laws determine the degree of segregation of the tool in relation 
to the agent, the 'belonging' of the movement to the tool or the agent, the formation of a 
unitary activity, the internal hierarchy of perception, etc"(p.l01). For the skittles 
mentioned above, he claims, "it is obviously 'me' who launches the ball, but it is no 
longer 'me' who knocks over the skittles but rather the ball that I had rolled in their 
direction....In fact, despite the duality of the actions, the player considers himself as the 
agent responsible for the result because he perceives 'himself as the original source of 
the entire process"(p.l02). 
Michotte argues that the 'bodily self should be considered as one object among others 
to be perceived. "It is natural that it should appear as the sole mover when we are using 
tools just as Object A (the 'motor1 object) does in our laboratory experiments, and for 
just the same reasons"(p.l02). 
A tool user has the role of the 'motor' object. But for being an intentional mover, at 
least he has to be able to envisage the event he is producing at some level as a unitary 
whole. He has to perform an action on the intermediate, the tool, which in turn has to 
perform an action on the target object, caused by the users activity. Because in the end 
the tool's 'action' on the target realizes the goal of the actor, he has to able to see the 
nesting of causal relationships involved. This doesn't imply that he has to know all 
details of the structure of the event he is going to produce. The actor has to cause a 
series of discontinuities of movements that are specific to the intended event. These 
discontinuities signify the appropriate units. The amount of skill, or knowledge 
required depends on the amount, and structure of physical, mechanical, constraints one 
has to meet during action. As an example consider one of the simplest tool use tasks 
used originally by Biihler (1930) for 10-months old children. The task was to pull a 
string with a cookie attached to it. The event to be produced is the cookie moving 
towards the child. Just one change must be initiated, that from a resting target to a 
moving one by just one action, i.e. the pulling. Here, the body-scaled information of 
the 'pullability' of the string is sufficient for acting successfully. The child needs to be 
aware of the connection of the string to the cookie, but not of the exact nature of the 
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connection. The object-scaled properties of cookie and string are irrelevant in this 
particular situation. 
But if the string is not yet connected, this object-scaled infonnation must be detected 
before the child can initiate the now much more complicated event of getting the cookie 
with the aid of the string. The event of 'connecting string and target' is a means to 
allow 'pulling' and in this sense is subordinate to it. The sufficient information for tool 
use now contains many more details. A nesting of subevents, discontinuities of a lower 
level, now contains the infonnation sufncient in this situation. Since the first change of 
the situation to be initiated is given its meaning by the last one, an actor should be 
aware of a more deeply nested structure before he can begin acting. 
The hierarchical structure anticipated of an action is continuously modified in a 
perception-action cycle. The 'tool-effect' demonstrated by Michotte shows how earlier 
information becomes reinterpreted in the context of later information. If we leave out 
the last of the two launchings, there is no impression of a tool if the first one is 
observed. If he intends to use a tool, the actor should have from the start the 
interpretation, an observer has obtained at the end of the event But if, for instance, the 
action has unexpected consequences, he should reinterpret the situation in a manner 
similar to the observer's case. 
Intentionality and action 
An event of a certain complexity can sometimes only be understood by a distant 
observer in retrospect. For instance, a person leaves the room, comes back later with a 
chair and sits down on it. For an observer, the event as a whole can be understood 
from the end. For the person himself, however, the action was specified from the start 
by his intention to sit down, and constrained by the situation that there was no chair in 
the room. 
This, intentional character of an action is taken into account in our description. 
Perceiving the event structure is necessary only if the individual act intentionally. 
These event structures should therefore be part of an ecological account of 
intentionality. Other attempts have been made to account for intentionality in the 
context of ecological realism. There are two principal lines to deal with intentionality 
within ecological realism. One aims at describing intentionality from the lawlike 
coupling between organism and environment (Kugler, Shaw, Vincente & Kinsella-
Shaw,1990; Turvey, Shaw, Reed & Mace, 1981; see also Looren de Jong, 1991) and 
the other in terms of that what relates current to future action in a genetic perspective 
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(Shotter, 1983; Ingold, 1986). The first account is based on the realism in Gibsonian 
thinking and the second on relationalism. 
The first approach deals with intentionality as that which directs action in a given 
situation. According to Turvey, Shaw, Reed & Mace (1981), intentionality is the 
mechanism that chooses among affordances to be realized. The actually perceived 
affordance in dynamic terms is described as the strongest attractor. According to 
Looien de Jong (1991), however, following the attraction of the immediately given in 
the environment is not an appropriate sense of intentionality, because directedness onto 
something not yet present cannot be dismissed from this concept. He prefers to speak 
of intentionality as "some kind of break-down of the direct nomic coupling between 
organism and environment, some dissociation where the organism supersedes 
nomological relations between behavior and environment, (...) characteristic of 
intentionality in perception (and, one might add, in action)"(p.97). As e.g. for tool 
making, and to a certain extent for tool use also, the object of intention is not 
immediately given, we must consider this approach the least promising as far as tool 
use is concerned. 
The second approach deals with intentionality in terms of the relation between a 
previous perception and its further specification by performing action (see Shotter, 
1983). Such a view has a relational character, since action is driven by experience, not 
by properties of the objectively existing world. This view has been clearly expressed in 
Searle's (1983) theory of intentionality. Ingold (1986) has emphasised similar views in 
an anthropological context 
Searle's relational theory of intentionality 
Searle (1983) provides a relational theory of intentionality, compatible with our view, 
in which intentionality is described in terms of conditions of satisfaction. These are in 
many respects similar for perception and action. For perception, a condition of 
satisfaction for an intentional act is the existence of the object perceived. The visual 
experience of a table as an intentional act has the presence of the table as condition of 
satisfaction. In the same manner, the experience of an action has actual movements as 
conditions of satisfaction. The action itself is a presentation of the conditions of 
satisfaction of that intention. "And just as the visual experience is not a representation 
of its conditions of satisfaction but a presentation of those conditions, so I want to say 
the experience of action is a presentation of its conditions of satisfaction. On this 
account, action, like perception, is a causal and intentional transaction between mind 
and the worldH(p. 88). In other words, intentionality is only realized within action 
when the perception of its conditions of satisfaction accompany the act. 
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Searle (1983) distinguishes between prior intention and intention in action. He calls a 
prior intention that which precedes action in the sense of anticipation of future state(s) 
of affairs or state(s) of the agent. For intention in action there is no such separation 
possible between intention and action because intention in action is equivalent to the 
experience of action. Consequently, prior intention is regarded as representation in the 
sense of a plan for action and intention in action as presentation. 
The concept of affordances is in accordance with the concept of intention in action. 
Perceiving affordances means perceiving relational properties of organism and 
environment that afford action directly, i.e. without representations. Perceiving the 
graspability of an object is the intentional content of the action of grasping. The 
ecological event of grasping contains the condition of satisfaction for the intention of 
graspability. In the form of intentionality in action, intentionality is thus inherent in the 
actual perception of affordances (Reed, 1983). 
Following Searle (1983), action is possible without prior intention, but there is no 
action without intention in action. Prior intention may cause an intention in action, 
which in tum causes the physical event that is the condition of satisfaction for the 
intention. Prior intention thus refers to a complex action as a whole (such as driving to 
my office). Once driving, the intention is carried out in action. Certain actions such as 
shifting the gear are intentional in action (they belong to the act of driving) but do not 
belong to the prior intention. 
Although prior intentions are not necessary for all intention in action, Searle is inexplicit 
whether there are circumstances in which they are. Whereas no prior intention is needed 
in order to sit down intentionally when a chair is at hand, sitting becomes a prior 
intention when there is nothing in the room to sit on. It is necessary for going out and 
bringing a chair. Sitting as prior intention refers to the action as a whole. Sitting cannot 
be understood as intention in action for leaving the room, since this act doesn't contain 
the conditions of satisfaction for sitting. But the intention of sitting causes the intention 
in action of leaving the room. 
Searle's prior intention as preceding action refers to a condition of affairs not yet 
present. A not yet existing state of affairs or goal, in terms of the affordance concept 
would mean that a possible, but not immediately realizable organism environment 
relationship that supersedes the immediately realizable ones. As an example consider 
grasping an object. A given situation may allow a realization directly. For an object 
within reach the actor may just perceive graspability specified by the relation between 
hand extension and object size and act intentionally without prior intention. But if the 
object is behind a barrier, the situation must be changed in a way that allows grasping. 
This requires prior intention. In this case attention must be paid to those invariants of 
the given situation that will enable grasping. Not yet present states of affairs 
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subordinate to the original goal have to be anticipated. In the case of tool use, a 
relationship between tool and target that correspond to the tools function would be such 
a future state. 
In our approach, the nested set of future states to be realized in order to reach a goal in a 
certain situation is given in awareness by the discontinuities in the event structure of the 
action. Because this event structure arises from the situation on hand, the intention is 
not a kind of plan in the sense of a map to read. Although perceptual specification of the 
situation on hand provide the direction for whether and how the goal will be realized 
(Shotter, 1983), it is not a specification of the action to be performed in the sense of a 
motor program. As 'maker1 of an event one will produce phenomenal causality. 
In human action, the actor himself causes phenomenal discontinuities. If the anticipated 
units of the event are compatible to the physical laws, the intended event will occur. Its 
phenomenal occurrence is the ecological event, not its physical occurrence. As actors 
we control phenomenal changes, not the changes in force fields that correspond to 
them. The phenomenal changes to be produced as a consequence of realizing 
affordances may be said to belong to the conditions of satisfaction of the intention. 
Conclusion 
The investigation of tool use within the concept of the Gibsonian ecological approach 
required an analysis of its potential for the description of complex action. Perception 
and action in this approach are studied as complementary modes of relating to the 
world. Perception of affordances enables action; through action the world is explored 
for perception. But the world cannot be regarded as an environment merely to be 
explored. Actors besides 'finders' are also 'makers' of their environment. People 
develop both by changing their perception and the circumstances to be perceived. Tools 
are a good illustration of this. 
That people are to be studied as makers of their environment made us give up the 
objectivism in Gibsonian thought, in favour of an exclusively relational approach. As a 
consequence, the only criterion for identifying an affordance as a specification of a state 
of affairs relevant for action, is the sufficiency of this specification for enabling action 
and not its physical uniqueness. What is sufficient may depend not only on the 
environmental circumstances, but also on the skills of the perceiver. Since sufficiency 
of infonnation is merely constrained, but not detennined by physical conditions, it must 
be studied in its phenomenal specificity. 
In our phenomenology, the information needed for using tools is both body-scaled and 
object-scaled. Affordances are usually studied in terms of body-scaled information 
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only. Object-scaled information has been studied as event perception in ecological 
realism, but without an observer actively taking pan in the event. Since action could be 
seen as actor-involving event, however, body-scaled information has to be combined 
with object-scaled information. A tool must be scaled to the body of its user and to the 
object to be worked on. 
No isolated object properties specify an object as tool. Among the properties that make 
a tool out of an object, is its character of a means to an end. The phenomenal specificity 
of a tool as means results from the entire tool use event. The perception of a tool in its 
character as a means to an end requires the integral anticipation of an event structure that 
contains the causal means-end characteristics to be produced in using the tool. From 
Michotte's work on phenomenal causality we learned that a means-end relation is 
ascribed to a distinctive, hierarchically organized pattern of discontinuities. These 
characteristic discontinuities indicate the units of the tool use event. 
Because a tool is a means to achieve a certain goal, intentionality is ascribed to the 
perception of objects as tools. We followed Searle's relational theory of intentionality. 
The discontinuities that correspond to the means-end characteristics of the tool use 
event could be seen as the conditions of satisfaction for the intention. Starting from 
Searle's dennition of basic actions we argued that in the case of emerging tool use there 
must be prior intention that causes intention in action. 
We have merely assembled the building blocks for a descriptive framework of tool use. 
We still are quite a few steps removed from an empirically testable theory. Some 
progress, however, could be made on account of our notion that tool use requires at 
some point in development a prior intention specified as a hierarchical structure of some 
complexity, of affordances. In order to test this account experimentally, we need on the 
one hand a rigorous definition of the complexity of the affoidance structure, as a 
predictor for task difficulty and on the other hand an account of development in terms 
of what enables a developing actor to deal with increasingly complex affordances. We 
proposed solutions to these problems in relation to our experimental work (regarding 
complexity, see Van Leeuwen, Smitsman, & Van Leeuwen, submitted) and (regarding 
development, see Van Leeuwen & Smitsman, forthcoming). 
The study of tool use thus led us to a revision of ecological concepts in a manner that 
touches on an on-going discussion concerning the relationship between ecological 
realism and Gestalt psychology (Natsoulas, 1991; Smith & Casati, in press; C. van 
Leeuwen, 1990a, 1990b; Zimmer & Kömdle, in press). Starting from an empirical, 
'theoretically neutral' issue we felt dismissed from a referee position and were able to 
approach the issues from a pragmatic point of view. A consistent approach to tool use 
was sought in a synthesis between the Gibsonian concepts with those of Michotte and 
Searle. It is possible that by doing so we reached a contemporary variant of a Gestalt 
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position (van Leeuwen & Stins, in press). We might consider the present view 
applicable, in principle, also to other complex tasks, including social behaviour. 
Because our primary aim was stretchmg the scope of Gibsonian views, the issue of tool 
use already proved to be a litheness test for this account of perception and action. 
Certainly, the issue of tool use is a lithmus test for it as well. 
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Tool use in early childhood; 
perception of a higher-order relationship 
Lieselotte van Leeuwen, 
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University of Nijmegen, The Netherlands 
& 
Cees van Leeuwen 
University of Amsterdam, The Netherlands 
Tools are characterized by their subordination into hierarchically organized action. Perceiving a tool 
affordance requires the integration of several complementary relationships. In the case of tool use these 
include relationships between actor, tool and target. The integration is introduced as described by a 
higher-order affordance structure. On the basis of a recursive definition of the higher-order affordance 
structure concept, the difficulty of perceiving the tool function could be theoretically determined from 
the integrational demands of the complementary relationships involved in perceiving this function. 
Predictions were put to a test in three experiments, involving children aged between 9 months and 4 
years. In a classical tool use task going back to Köhler, a desirable target had to be brought within 
reach by using a hook as a tool. By varying the relative position of the hook and the target, the 
difficully of perceiving the tool function of the hook was shown to be in accordance with the 
theoretical description. 
Introduction 
The aim of this article is to investigate tool use from an ecological point of view 
(Gibson, 1979). Beginning in the second year of life, tool use could be regarded as a 
primary instance of complex action. The action radius of the child is stretched beyond 
the limitations of the body; a toy out of reach can now be retrieved by means of a stick. 
A striking characteristic of this newly emerged form of action, is that the stick is used 
as a means to an end. This should therefore play an important role in study of tool use 
as a distinctive kind of action. Most psychological studies however, do not focus on 
tool use in its own right, but merely use it as an instance of skill learning. From a 
motoric point of view, Conolly & Dalgleish (1989) studied how in mastering the 
manipulations of the spoon, the differentiation in grasping increases with age. Despite 
the detailed character of the analysis, their description did not distinguish the 
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manipulations of objects as tools from other object manipulations. Yet, one year old 
children are able to handle a stick skillfully, before they start using it as a tool. 
Tool use has been investigated from a cognitive point of view (Brown, 1990; 
Greenfield, 1991; Koslowski & Braner, 1972). Koslowski & Bruner (1972) used tool 
use tasks to study the early acquisition of human problem solving. They described how 
a toy is obtained with the aid of a lever. Because a direct solution by means of reaching 
for the object would fail, solving the problem was assumed to require the 
"reorganization of the components of the situation into a detour structure, cf. Köhler, 
1917" (p.797). The specific character of tools in solving such detour problems was not 
the focus of their interest. In their view behaviour is driven by an abstract 
representation, that conceives detour problems involving tools similar to those not 
involving tools. 
Greenfield (1991) described tool use actions like eating with a spoon in terms of an 
action grammer. Tool use was described in analogy to the most advanced-level strategy 
children use for nesting three cups of different size into each other, viz. the 
subassembly strategy. Subassembly means that "two cups are combined to form a 
higher-order unit, which is in turn combined with a third cup to make the final 
structure" (p. 532). Cups can be nested by less advanced strategies, ones that "... 
involve only one level of combination: Two or more cups are combined in a chain-like 
sequence to make the final structure" (p. 532). Tool use tasks, however, can only be 
performed by a subassembly strategy, because of the hierarchic organization of means 
and end. 
Although the complexity of tool use should also play a distinctive role for a Gibsonian 
account, this approach would be dissatisfied with complexity as expressed in an 
abstract action hierarchy, e.g. in number of items involved in a subassembly strategy. 
From an action point of view, the development of tool use shows integration of action. 
Integration is more than just nesting of increasingly complex structures. It also implies 
the smoothness, parallellism, etc, with which actions are assembled. In this sense, the 
ecological approach may be expected to go one important step beyond the subassembly-
view. Besides the complexity expressed in terms of number of units in a hierarchy, also 
the kind of integration wil have to be studied in a unified framework. Moreovever, such 
an approach will give central importance to the role of perception for guiding action. 
Tool use has been investigated from a perceptual point of view by Bates, Carlson-
Luden & Bretherton, (1980), Köhler (1917) and Richardson (1932). Köhler (1917) in 
his famous primate studies showed the important role that the perceived spatial layout 
plays in the emergence of tool use. In a situation consisting of an actor, an object out of 
reach and a tool for obtaining the object, perceived spatial contact between object and 
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tool was shown to facilitate tool use. Richardson (1932) applied Köhler's tool use 
configurations to children and obtained similar results. 
Whereas spatial contact as such can be both useful or irrelevant, in these studies it was 
always useful. In other words, the spatial characteristics of the contact were not 
distinguished from their functional ones. Therefore these studies do not reveal whether 
perceiving the tool function is due to spatial contact as such or to its functional 
significance. Bates, Carlson-Luden & Bretherton (1980) suggested in their study with 
10-month-old children that "primitive tool use involves knowledge of how two distinct 
objects can be used together in problem solving" (p. 137). They argued that, when there 
is no spatial contact, anticipatory imagery is necessary to perceive the tool function. But 
also these authors didn't vary the functional significance of spatial characteristics. 
Brown (1990) proceeded beyond the purely spatial characteristics of the 
configurations. She argued that the facilitatory character of spatial contact is due to 
"insightful learning and transfer on the basis of deep structural principles, rather than 
mere reliance on salient perceptual features" (p. 130). In her experiments, she showed 
that when spatial contact between target and tool was relevant for performing the task, 
like in Köhler's experiments, children quickly generalize tool use over surface 
properties of the configuration. This might seem in accordance with her view that a 
deep structure is involved. But for Brown, "deep" means "abstract", rather than 
functional for a task. In some of her conditions, however, she introduced another tool 
(a magnet), for which contact played no functional role. Here, generalization was much 
slower to occur. She used the fact that generalization occurred after all as an argument 
for the irrelevance of salient properties in the surface layout But the difference in time 
needed to acquire the generalization in our view shows that those salient features 
sometimes do matter. Therefore, Brown's study illustrates rather the opposite of its 
conclusion, that the structures involved are not abstract, conceptual ones, but may be 
perceptual ones of a nature yet to be clarified. A theory should be able to pick out the 
perceptual factors that matter, rather than treat them as irrelevant variations. 
Despite the fact that the above studies have addressed the issue of tool use from 
different viewpoints, they all seem to share a common assumption, viz. that the 
predominant source of difficulty of the tool use task is due to the difficulty of finding an 
adequate abstract representation (of a motoric, cognitive or perceptual nature). 
A different view is suggested by the work of Michotte (1951/1991). He studied the so 
called 'tool effect', i.e. the direct impression of the functioning of a tool. His question 
was, whether "...the hammer manipulated by the user gives us a direct impression of 
being an intermediary, that is a means of execution, which is itself devoid of any 
initiative" (p.88). In his experiments, Michotte used an object that launched another 
one, and this one in turn launched a third object. Subjects attributed distinctive 
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phenomenal qualities to the causal role of both the initial mover (the "motor" object) and 
the intermediary, which was perceived to be a "tool". "The intervention of the 
intermediary appears to be purely passive and dependent on the action of the motor 
object with which it is integrated as a constituent part; it is this which gives it a 
characteristic phenomenal aspect."(p.98). The impression of an object as inteimediary 
and passive depends on speed of motion and distance covered. With decreasing speed 
or increasing distance, the impression became weaker or disappeared. Then, the 
intermediary object is no longer perceived as passive but as self acting. 
According to Michotte, the 'tool effect' is an awareness, not reducible to the event's 
mechanical components, such as launchings, in isolation. This, because it is not their 
mere sequence that yields the phenomenal impression of an intermediate, but their 
manifestation as a hierarchically organized time structure, "...under certain conditions, 
the entire causal chain, as well as its internal dynamic hierarchy, is manifest (i.e., the 
exclusive activity of the motor object). In these cases the tool effect is an immediate 
datum, which is complete and open to view."(p.l01). What Michotte describes as a 
hierarchically organized time structure for the perception of the 'tool effect', 
corresponds at an abstract level to the hierarchic organization in subassembly strategies 
for action as described by Greenfield (1991). 
But in addition, Michotte emphasized regarding the relation of perception and action, 
that the perception of those causal relations is the basis of our understanding of the 
event we observe as well as of the one we produce. "It is hardly necessary to stress that 
causal relations are essential to our knowledge of the world, since they seem to provide 
valid explanations of the changes that occur both around and inside us. Moreover, they 
allow us both to predict the occurrence of certain events and ultimately to control or 
adapt to them" (Michotte et al., 1963/1991, p.66). Michotte thus suggests that if the 
perceiver of the event is also involved in it as actor, the phenomenal 'tool effect' that is 
available to perception is the same as the one that has to be produced in action. Thus, 
like Gibson (1979), Michotte assumes action as guided by perception; tool use could 
be performed optimally under permanent perceptual guidance. More importantly, 
perceiving a tool then depends on the ability to anticipate the complex causal event 
structure involved in tool use. 
For Michotte, a complex, organized event structure can be immediately given in 
perception. Because we believe that if Gibsonian conceptions should be made 
applicable to complex actions such as tool use, a similar assumption should be made for 
it. In our next session, we shall therefore deal with the intricacies of applying the 
Gibsonian conceptions in this spirit. 
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Tools and affordances 
Gibson (1979) and Shaw & Turvey (1981) have been arguing more explicitly than 
Michotte that perception is for action. The action relevance of perception is the detection 
of affordances. Affordances are potential complementary relations between an organism 
and its environment.They indicate how the world could be acted upon by the organism. 
For instance, an affordance of an object could be "ability to grasp". Thus action, 
viewed as the realization of affordances, is intimately related to perception: the 
affordances perceived have their counteiparts in effectivities of the organism. 
Effectivities are the way the actor could use the biomechanical characteristics of its body 
to act upon the world. 
A cornerstone in Shaw & Turvey's (1981) concept of ecological realism is the principle 
of duality of affordances and effectivities. Only those affordances make sense, to which 
a complementary effectivity exists, and vice versa. With this principle, they were able 
to dismiss the objection that the concept of affordance would exclude nothing and 
therefore be devoid of content. 
In agreement with Shaw and Turvey's principle, we might regard the perception of a 
tool as a complementary relation between what the tool affords to the perceiver and 
what the perceiver can effectuate with the tool. We might also specify what the target 
affords to the actor. But in case of tool use the actor doesn't have the corresponding 
effectivities to realize this affordance immediately. Only by means of a tool the actor has 
the required effectivities for realizing the target affordance. This implies that realizing 
the affordance of the target involves not only a dual relationship between actor and 
target but also ones between actor and tool, and between tool and target 
However, by following Shaw & Turvey's approach strictly, the description of tool use 
would merely require that the complementary relations between actor and target, 
between actor and tool and between tool and target are described as dualities. Dualities 
could be described between actor and an Object 1, between actor and an Object 2 and 
between Object 1 and Object 2. But none of these dualities in isolation would pick out 
Object 1 or Object 2 as the tool and the other one as the target. It is essential for the tool 
that it combines properties that relate it to both the actor and another object in a manner 
that allows the actor to handle this object. What is meant is most clearly illustrated by 
the screwdriver. One of its ends is a potential complementarity with a screw (target 
object) the other is a potential complementarity with the actor's hand. 
An object has no tool affordance irrespective of the target. Likewise a tool cannot be 
treated as a mere effectivity of the actor in the sense of Shaw & Turvey (1991). A stick 
already in the hand could be viewed as an effectivity of the actor. Even a stick on the 
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floor could be viewed that way, if we assume that it is unintentionally picked up, and 
once picked up could be used. But in order to explain why a stick is deliberately chosen 
by the actor as a means to an end, the specific tool affordance of the stick has to be 
taken into account. Tool affordance (and effectivities) must be described as 
complementarily related to both, actor and target 
Higher-order affordance structures 
The affordance of a stick as tool for retrieving a distant toy is built out of several 
possible complementary relations between physical properties of the tool, such as its 
shape, size, texture or mass, and corresponding physical properties of the actor's 
grasping system such as shape, size, force or accuracy of motor control. A stick can 
have a wide variety of affordances, which correspond to a variety of possible actions. 
Only a small subset of these affordances (and the corresponding effectivities) involve 
the stick as a tool. This subset is determined, among others, by the relation between 
stick and toy. Properties as shape, size, texture and mass of the toy in relation to 
similar, complementary properties of the stick determine, whether the actor can 
manipulate the toy by means of the stick. For instance, the stick must at the same time 
be light enough to be manageable (stick-actor) and strong enough to manipulate the 
target (stick-toy). At the same time the subset of manipulations is constrained by the 
affordance relations between actor and toy. These affordances correspond to the 
potentials to exert transformations on the юу. For instance, if the toy at issue is a tower 
of blocks and the actor has the aim of playing with an intact tower, its instability 
necessitates a minimal tolerable shakiness in stick use. Likewise, the relations between 
actor and target, as well as between tool and target are constrained from the respective 
remaining relationships. 
We could describe the means character of an object as tool in terms of affordance 
structures by assuming a higher-order structure that describes the mutual constraints as 
dual relationships between tool and target, tool and actor, and target and actor. In order 
to state the interdependence of these relationships, maintaining the duality principle, we 
propose a concept of higher-order complementarities. Since an affordance of a tool as a 
means contains the proposed higher-order structure of complementarities we will speak 
of a higher-order affordance structure. With this notion, we implement a suggestion by 
Kugler & Shaw (1990), Cutting (1991) and Gray, Neisser, Shapiro & Kouns (1991) 
to extend the established concepts of ecological realism into still higher-order concepts, 
preserving their duality characteristics. 
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Figure 1: The relationships between actor, tool and target as mutually constraining 
complementarities in a second-order affordance structure. 
When these structures are called (higher-order) affordances, this is because they contain 
body-scaled information. Body-scaled information is a consequence of the principle of 
duality. Affordances are described as a ratio of environmental and organismic 
properties, such as height of an object in relation to the observer's eyeheight. However, 
in the case of tool use, complementary relationships between tool and target are 
involved. An object-object complementarity obviously cannot be expressed in terms of 
ratios between organism and environment. Thus the higher-order structure to be 
perceived entails besides body-scaled information for the actor-tool and actor-target 
complementarities also information about object properties scaled in reference to each 
other, instead of to the body. Merely object-scaled information cannot be qualified as 
information specifying an affordance. Since an object-object complementarity must be 
realized by action, it must be complementanly related to an affordance at a higher-order 
level. Then, not a single object, but a complementary relationship between objects 
affords an action. 
Object-scaled information and events 
Complementarities between objects or parts of objects have been studied under the 
heading of event perception (Cutting, Proffitt, & Kozlowski, 1978; Johansson, 1973). 
Cutting (1981) points out that the perception of events contains two kinds of invariants; 
topographic ones, which refer to structural ratios between object or parts of objects in 
space, and dynamic invariants, that refer to invariant ratios in time. Both kinds of 
invariants are assumed to constrain each other. According to Michotte (1963/1991), 
action can be regarded as the production of an event in which the actor participates. The 
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perceiving organism is involved, not merely as 'observer1 but as 'maker* as well. In a 
tool use event, a tool user has the role of the 'motor' object 
The tool user is producing an event, of which the final state was the desired outcome in 
the beginning. In other words, there must be some form of intentionality: the whole 
event subserves reaching a certain state which terminates the event. This implies that at 
least the actor has to be able to envisage the event he is producing at some level as an 
integral whole. He has to perform an action on the intermediate, the tool, which in turn 
has to perform an action on the target object, caused by the users activity. Because in 
the end the tool's 'action' on the target realizes the goal of the actor, he has to able to 
see in advance the possibility of using the tool as a means to his end. In other words, to 
perceive the affordance of the tool implies to have a prospective view of the entire 
structure of the event that leads to the realization. 
The obvious question, in how much detail is the actor able to foresee the event 
structure is closely related to the question what the units of the event structure are. 
Therefore, a further specification of our views will have to proceed through a 
discussion of this issue. According to Cutting (1981), a minimum principle 
(Leeuwenberg, 1971; Restie, 1979) could be applied to obtain an event structure with 
least number of components to adequately describe the event. Cutting envisaged object 
motion components. If the perceiver is actively participating in the event, however, 
such a view needs modification. Gibson points out that events can have affordances 
and that they could change the affordances of a situation. Actions could bring about 
these changes. Shotter (1983) describes action as "that aspect of human activity in 
which people make a difference in their environments" (p. 32). An unfolding action-
event will lead to changes in the situation, leading to new affordances. This allows that 
the action could procede with minimal subjective control demands. A full specification 
for control purposes of the event structure in advance is not necessary, as the unfolding 
action leads to affordances which could take the role of controlling the action. We must 
look for the minimal units that are sufficently specific to allow these controls to evolve. 
What is sufficient depends on the actor's goal, his or her skills and the physical 
constraints of the situation. When the actor is less sensitive to the affordances resulting 
from the unfolding event, he must rely more on his internal controls. Accordingly, the 
units of the event can only be determined relationally, from the event context itself. 
According to Gibson, (1979) events have a structure consisting of discontinuities in the 
stream of information. In the case of changes in the layout of surfaces, discontinuities 
concern, for example, changes in the topological relationships between objects (e.g. the 
realization of spatial contact). We may follow this approach in our definition of units of 
the event structure as intervals that are bounded by such discontinuities. For instance, if 
the goal is eating with a spoon, grasping the spoon in the manner appropriate for eating 
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could be a unit in the overall act of eating. If so, its borders must be marked by 
discontinuities. The discontinuitity that marks the beginning is the initiation of the hand 
movement, the discontinuity marking the ending of the episode is the realization of 
contact between hand and spoon. 
Which discontinuities are selected as boundaries, and which ones are considered 
irrelevant, may depend on the context. For eating with a spoon, a skilled spoon user 
should not differentiate the grasping further into subunits. For a child, learning to eat 
with a spoon, subunits concerning the constraints of e.g. place of grasping, kind of 
grasp, etc, could be relevant. Depending on an actors skill, the units are finer or 
coarser. Likewise, a different goal in the same situation (e.g. making noise with spoon 
and food) may lead to a description with different units for the action-event. Therefore, 
there is no user-independent complexity of the event structure. 
The contex-sensitivity of both complexity doesn't always preclude a comparison 
between situations. E.g. in a situation where some of the complementarities relevant for 
an action are already realized, there is of course no prospective perception of these 
events needed. In such a situation, therefore the same goal could be reached by 
perceiving a less complex structure. This suggests, more generally, that number of 
discontinuities in motion that specify the tool's function as a mediatory could be used as 
a first measure of complexity. Each discontinuity corresponds to the realization of a 
complementary relationships between actor, tool and target, relevant for the tool to 
function. In the following we will refer to this factor as the number of complementary 
relationships to be realized. Number refers to structural invariants in space (in the sense 
of Cutting, 1981) that are realized by an actor. 
The dynamical invariants, by contrast, should refer to the way these structural 
invariants are realized in time. For tool use this concerns the temporal integration of 
those discontinuities that specify the 'mediatory' character of the tool and the 'motor' 
character of the actor. In the following we will refer to this factor as the kind of 
temporal integration. Which discontinuities are relevant and how they are to be 
temporally integrated in the event structure depends on the situation on hand. The 
amount of skill, or knowledge required depends on the amount, and structure of 
physical, mechanical, constraints one has to meet during action. 
As mentioned earlier in our introduction, an approach that uses merely number as 
complexity measure, will not be able to make predictions that are better than the ones 
from a cognitivist approach, e.g. because the complexity of subassembly strategy 
(Greenfield, 1991) could be modelled so as to covary with number complexity. By 
contrast, kind is specific to the ecological approach. 
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Number of complementary relationships Consider an object out of reach 
which can be obtained with a hook. We assume the target out of reach to be within the 
crook part of a hook. Obtaining the target requires pulling the hook. In terms of our 
theoretical concept there are two first-order complementarities to be realized. One 
between hook and target (Aencj) that corresponds to the goal of the action, i.e. the 
reachability of the target, and one between actor and hook (Aj) that correspond to the 
action to be performed on the tool in order to reach the goal. A complementary 
relationship between tool and target is already realized, so that for reaching the target, 
the actor merely has to pull the hook in a manner that the hook moves the target 
towards the actor. This event to be produced in the tool use action is characterized by 
the production of two discontinuities. The event structure is mirrored by the second-
order affordance structure that refers to the integration of the two first-order 
complementarities Ag^ and Aj (see Formula 1). 
Kind of temporal integration. The factor kind allowes to describe how in 
complex action different complementary relationships between actor and environment 
are to be realized in time. In a higher-order affordance structure, the relationship 
between mechanical characteristics as well as the skill level of the actor constrain, how 
these different complementarities are to be realized in time, in sequence (diachronously) 
or in parallel (synchronously). Because the target in our task can only be moved by the 
hook while the actor pulls it, Aen(j and A\ must be realized at one moment, 
synchronously. (Synchronous integration is indicated in Formula 1 by a period 
separating Aencj and Aj). There are cases, in which different complementary 
relationships can be realized one by one, in a temporal sequence. This kind of temporal 
integration is called diachronous. (Diachronous integration is indicated in the formulas 
by a comma separating lower-order complementarities). 
If in the hook task, the target initially is not yet within the crook part of the hook, this 
position must be realized before the target can be moved by pulling the hook. The 
required complementary relationship between tool and target (OQ) must be ralized by an 
extra action on the tool (actor-tool). This action refers to a subevent consisting in 
analogy to Formula 1 of two discontinuities that refer to the integration of two 
complementary relationships AQ and OQ into a second-order affordance structure (see 
Formula 2). AQ and OQ are to be realized simultaneously. They are therefore described 
as synchronously integrated into the second-order affordance structure A ^ . To 
describe the complete event structure for obtaining the target in this case, the two 
second-order affordance structures A^j and A ^ have to be put in their appropriate 
temporal relation. They can be realized in sequence. Therefore the third-order 
affordance structure in Formula 3 (see p. 42) is a diachronous one. 
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2) A 2 2 (OQ.AO) 
3) Α*ι ((Ax.Aend), (OO-AQ)) 
The affoidance structures in Fonnulas 1 and 3 differ with respect to number and kind 
of temporal integration. That such differences in complexity could influence the 
difficulty to perceive an object as tool is suggested by the results of Köhler 1917. A 
stick was perceived as a tool in a situation where it was in spatial contact with the 
target, but not if otherwise. Spatial contact could be viewed as a tool-target relationship 
already realized in the first situation, but merely possible in the second. Thus the 
difficulty of perceiving the tool function of an object depends on the complexity of the 
event structure to be perceived, in order to produce the action. Complexity was 
measured by number and kind of temporal integration. The factor of number will be 
investigated in Experiments 1 and 2. It will be argued that the factor kind is also needed 
to explain all data. In Experiment 3 we shall deal with the factor kind. 
Experiment 1 
Introduction 
Experiment 1 was performed to obtain an initial evaluation of our description. The task 
was to bring a target within reach with the aid of a hook. The spatial relationship 
between hook and target was varied. Therefore, in order to perceive the hook as a tool 
in the configurations, event structures of different complexity must be anticipated. 
Children of different ages were compared with respect to their ability to perceive the 
hook as a tool in the five configurations of Figure 2. We sought to determine an age 
group sensitive to the difficulty of our conditions. If a child can use tools in some, but 
not all of the configurations, he will be able to do so in those which possess a less 
complex affoidance structure. 
Choice of the configurations. For all the configurations in Figure 2, the hook 
functions only if the crook is oriented towards the target, hook and target are in contact 
and the target lies within the crook. As will become clear, the event structure that leads 
to this end is similar for all configurations. The highest-order affordance structure 
requires diachronous integration, whereas all nested ones are synchronous. This allows 
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the comparison of the affordance structures with respect to the number of second-order 
affordances at third-order level to be meaningful. The fewer relations in Figure 2 are 
realized, the more second-order synchronous affordance structures are contained in the 
third-order affordance structure. Therefore, the more difficult it will be to perceive the 
tool function of the hook. 
Diachronous affordance structures impose weakest possible integration demands. There 
may be more sophisticated ways of actually performing the task. We do not exclude 
that the nested second-order affordance structures are realized synchronously. This, 
however, does not affect the number of affordances to be integrated. 
r\ r\ r\ r\ 
Figure 2: Configurations from Experiments 1-2 
ОЗ 
0 2 —fr-
Figure 3: complementary relationships between tool and target that should maximally 
be changed in the given configurations for using the hook as tool. 
Affordance structures of the configurations. The three relationships between 
tool and target that matter in Figure 2 are the crook orientation of the hook with respect 
to the target, the spatial contact between the two and the height of the target with 
respect to the hook. In Figure 3 these are indicated as Ol, θ2 and O3 respectively. If 
one of these is already realized in a configuration, there is accordingly one discontinuity 
less in the event structure. The actor shouldn't even be aware of the realization in the 
same sense as a driver doesn't need to know how the engine of his car is constructed in 
order to drive, as long as it works. 
Table 1 contains the first-order complementarities involving the actor-tool and actor-
target relationships, as well as the ones between tool and target specified in Figure 3. 
A1-A3 correspond to the actions to be performed in order to realize О1-О3. The 
affordance Agnd is the reachability of the target, i.e. the end to which the hook is the 
means. Aend can only be realized by means of A4, that indicates the pullability of the 
hook. Realizing A4 leads only to Aend· however, if the target is within the crook. 
Thus temporal integration of those first-order complementarities into a second-order 
affordance structure is required. The second-order affordances are given in the last 
column of Table 1. Besides the one that relates A4 to Aend» there are three more 
second-order affordance structures for relating A1-3 to О1-3 respectively. The third-
order affordance structures that specify the tool function, integrates different numbers 
of these second-order affordance structures for Configurations a-e. How many are 
needed for each is shown in Table 2. 
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In Configuration a, all required tool-target complementarities from Figure 3 are already 
realized As just pulling the hook in Configuration a realizes the tool function no third-
order level integration is required. For the others there are third-order affordance 
structures of increasing complexity. Configuration d has an equally complex higher-
order affordance structure as Configuration e. This, although spatial contact exists 
between hook and target in Configuration d. However, spatial contact is not functional 
for hook use before the proper orientation is realized. Spatial contact (O2) thus is 
subordinated temporally to the proper orientation (Ol). Since in Configuration d the 
proper onentation (Ol) is not yet realized, functional contact (O2) has to be anticipated 
like in Configuration e. Number of second-order affordance structures for all 
configurations is specified in the last column of Table 2. 
Table 1: first-order and second-order complementarities of the hook. 
actor-hook hook-target actor-target A 2 
Al 
A2 
A3 
A4 
Ol orientation 
O2 contact 
О3 height 
(Al.Oi) 
(A2.O2) 
(A3.O3) 
Aend (A4.Aend) 
Table 2: Number complexity of five tool use configurations. 
Configuration hook affordance structures number 
a Aa
2
 (A4.Aend) 1 
b АьЗ ((A3.O3), (A4.ACnd)) 2 
с АсЗ ((А2.02),(Аз.Оз), (A4.Aend)) 3 
d Ad3 ((Аі.Оі),(А2.02).(Аз.Оз), (АфАепсі)) 4 
e Ad3((Ai.Oi),(A2.02),(A3.03),(A4.Aend)) 4 
Note, number regards the second-order affordance structures to be integrated 
temporally for Configurations a-e. 
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Hypotheses. The prediction according to Table 2 is called the number hypothesis of 
Experiment 1. This hypothesis predicts relative difficulty of the configurations, 
according to the complexity of the tool affordance structure: a < b < c < d = e. 
An alternative hypothesis could be obtained from a research tradition directly inspired 
by Köhler (1917). Köhler had noticed that the lack of spatial contact between a stick 
and a target made it difficult to perceive the stick as tool. Accordingly, Zhukova (1960) 
concluded that the relevant configurational property is whether tool and target together 
could be viewed as one object. Tool and target would be viewed as one object if they 
are in spatial contact, based on the law of proximity. Köhler himself never formulated 
such a hypothesis, but through the follow-up research of Bates et al. (1980), this 
hypothesis became known as the explanation from Köhler's Gestalt psychology. We 
will therefore compare our predictions with ones from this contact hypothesis. Since 
there is spatial contact between target and object in Configurations a, b and d, these are 
predicted by the contact hypothesis to be less difficult than Configurations с and e. In 
addition, no differences are predicted between a, b and d and neither between с and e. 
In our view spatial contact between tool and target is not important as a cue for object 
identity. Spatial contact may facilitate the anticipation of the goal state, as in 
Configurations a and b and therefore we agree with the contact hypothesis in predicting 
that these configurations will be easy. But both approaches diverge in their prediction 
for Configuration d, in which the spatial contact is not functional. According to the 
contact hypothesis, the difficulty of the configurations will be: a - b ~ d < c ~ e 
Method 
Subjects. The experiment was performed in eight nursery schools in the Dutch towns 
of Breda and Nijmegen. Parents and nurses had been contacted by letter explaining the 
purposes of the experiment and asking permission for the the children's participation in 
our experiment. Fiftyseven infants and young children between 8 months and 3.4 years 
of age, 26 females and 31 males participated in the experiment. The subjects were 
divided in two different treatment groups according to age, the "younger" ones 
(between 8 and 22 months) and the "older" ones (between 23 months and 3.8 years). 
Stimuli. The five configurations shown in Figure 2 were used. 
Material. Plastic hooks, about 60 cm long, approximately 12 mm cross-section, 12 
cm width at the crook part and with a weight of 75 g (sufficiently light for the child to 
handle), were used. It is important that children have motoric skills sufficient to 
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perform elementary actions with the hook. Their ability to handle, lift, aim and 
transport were observed in a familiarization phase. The experiment was performed at a 
1.20 χ 2 m table adjusted to normal children's location. As targets, cookies of 10 cm in 
diameter were used during the training and in the first experimental trial. In subsequent 
experimental trials, we used checkers for the "older" treatment group and 6 different 
little rubber animals of about 10 cm in diameter and height for the "younger" group. 
These differences, as well as some differences in procedure, were considered essential 
to motivate both groups equally for the task. The "younger" group was given a likeable 
toy as target and the "older" group a checker, because for the latter group, the 
experiment was intrinsically motivating as a game. Securing motivation was believed to 
be more important than dragging them through outwardly identical procedures, 
disregarding motivation. We are aware that as a consequence, differences between the 
"older" and "younger" groups may be ascribed to these differences in treatment. If, 
however, the trends within the groups are consistent with the trend between the groups, 
we have a check on the validity of our disregarding these differences in treatment 
During the experiment, older children stood in front of the table on a 30 χ 30 χ 5 cm 
concrete flag-stone which marked the middle position. An assistant experimenter (a 
teacher or mother) was behind the child. The younger children were sitting on the 
assistant experimenter's lap. This was done in order to assure that children in the 
younger as well as in the older group were in contact with the table, their hips about 10 
centimeter below the top of the table. In this way the action radius for both groups was 
made comparable. The whole set-up is shown in Figure 4. 
border of the within reach area 
child О 
О 
experimenter 
table 
Figure 4: Experimental setting used in Experiment 1 
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Procedure. The experiment consisted of three phases, of which Phases 1 and 2 were 
for instruction and Phase 3 was the experimental phase. Phases 1 and 3 were identical 
for the "older" and the "younger" groups, whereas Phase 2, the second part of the 
instruction, differed. In Phase 1, children were given the opportunity to become 
familiar with the hook. A child received the hook for approximately two minutes of free 
manipulation. Then the experimenter took the hook back. Phase 2 was performed in 
order to make clear what is within reach. On entering Phase 2, a toy was presented out 
of reach to the "younger" group. Children showed interest in the toy by trying to 
approach it by all possible means, e.g. reaching for it, climbing on the table, etc. 
Climbing, however, was prevented by the assistant experimenter during this phase and 
the next ones. In this manner, the child is familiarized with the impossibility in these 
configurations to obtain the target desired by such direct means as reaching or climbing. 
Such restrictions on exploration the child is familiar with from everyday experience. 
They are therefore ecologically valid. If the child showed no interest in the toy, another 
one was tried. Children who showed no interest in any of the toys were dismissed from 
further participation. 
In the "older" group in Phase 2, a child was shown a checker three times subsequently, 
the first time within reach, the second time at the border of the within reach area and the 
third time out of reach. Each time the child was asked if he or she could get the checker. 
If it was clear to the child that the first two checkers were within reach but the third one 
was not, a cookie was placed out of reach for the child and the experimenter asked if 
the child wanted to have the cookie. If the answer is "yes" the child is admitted to 
Phase 3. 
Phase 3, the experimental phase, was the same for both treatment groups. 
Configuration a (the easiest one according to both alternative hypotheses) was always 
presented first. In subsequent trials, the Configurations b-e were presented in random 
order. In order to control the motivation in the "younger" group, the target was brought 
within reach after each trial. If the child started playing with it, the child was assumed 
to be still motivated and the experiment continued. If not, the child was dismissed from 
the experiment. The orientation of the hook (left or right) was balanced between 
subjects. Before a configuration was presented, the assistant experimenter covered the 
table from the child's view with a huge picture book. She pointed out pictures in the 
book for the purpose of distracting the child from the experimenter. Meanwhile, the 
experimenter positioned a tool use configuration on the table. Then the book was 
removed so the child could see the configuration. The experimenter asked: "Can you 
make this cookie (or the animal) come to you" (The phrase: "Can you get the cookie" 
would not work well in Dutch, because of the grasping connotations for almost all 
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Dutch equivalents of 'getting'). A video-camera registered the behaviour of the child. If 
he or she attempted to climb on the table, this was prevented by the assistant 
experimenter. If, after some time there was no successful tool use, the child was given 
a small hint: the assistant experimenter pulled the hook approximately S cm in the 
direction of the child and the child was allowed to try again. If the small hint still didn't 
lead to success, the assistant experimenter fully modelled the required action with the 
hook, put it back in its original position and allowed the child to try it once more. 
Models were given in order to exclude any kind of socially motivated prevention of a 
solution or a lack of concentration, for instance as a result of being totally fixated on the 
target Subsequently, regardless of whether the child had been unsuccessful or 
successful directly, after a hint or after a full model, the same configuration was 
presented once more. This repetition of a trial was performed in order to make sure that 
an eventual success or failure was not a coincidence. Ultimately successful solutions 
with or without a model were counted separately. Children who didn't get a cookie 
after the first trial were given one. 
so 
Results and Discussion. 
Because both the number hypothesis and the contact hypothesis apply only to those 
children who are able to solve some but not all of the confîgurations, our analysis must 
begin by distinguishing them. 
Three groups were distinguished: the unsuccessful group that solved the tool problem 
in less than 33% of all confîgurations given (n = 14; mean age = 10.6 months; sd = 
1.83). The half-way group with children who had success from 33% up to 66% of the 
configurations (n = 29; mean age = 20.1 months; sd = 3.64). Finally, the successful 
group with children who had success in more than 66% of the configurations (n = 21; 
mean age = 30.1 months; sd = 5.02). The half-way group is a mixture of the "older" 
and "younger" treatment group. Within this half-way group, performance of subjects 
from the "older" and "younger" treatment group is similar. This suggests that we may 
neglect the differences in procedure between these groups due to our decision to control 
motivation. The unsuccessful group consists only of children from the "younger" 
group and the successful group has only "older" ones. It was assumed that the 
predictions of both the number hypothesis and the contact hypothesis primarily apply 
to the half-way group. From the other groups, the unsuccessful ones are assumed to be 
unable yet to perceive the function of the tool, whereas the successful group may fail to 
discriminate, because their large percentages of success provide a ceiling effect. 
(for the observation categories, see Appendix 1). 
For all three groups, the percentages of success are shown in Figure 5 for the 
Configurations a-e. Success in a certain configuration is defined as obtaining the target 
independently by means of the tool for two times, regardless of having a model or not. 
An analysis of variance concerning the mean success over all configuration yields a 
main effect for the three groups (F2,8 = 51.148, ρ < 0.001). 
The following results are of the half-way group. Within group differences concerning 
the frequency of success per configuration were tested with McNemar chi-square 
procedure (for the significances see Appendix 2). From the comparisons we get the 
following relations: 
Difficulty of Configuration a ~ b < c < d < e 
number hypothesis a < b < c < d ~ e 
cowioct-hypothesis a ~ b ~ d < c ~ e 
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Significant differences between Configurations b and d as well as between 
Configurations с and e are evidence against the contact hypothesis. 
The number hypothesis is more in accordance with the experimental results. However, 
two of the ten possible relationships are not in accordance with the predictions, viz. the 
expected difference between Configurations a and b failed to occur. Instead, there was 
an unexpected difference between Configurations d and e. Both deviations are in favour 
of the contact hypothesis. So we need to further analyze the data in order to decide 
about the role of spatial contact 
From Figure 5, it is likely that the nonsignificance of the difference between 
Configurations a and b is due to a ceiling effect. The unexpected difference in 
Configurations d and e, however, suggest that a refinement of our assumptions is 
necessary. Our theoretical description was based on the assumption that the child could 
only bring the target within reach by placing the crook of the hook behind it and 
pulling. Our materials afford another possibility not yet taken into account. This 
possibility would be to use the hook as a stick, pushing the target in a circular 
movement within reach. This stick use according to the affordance structure concept 
necessarily requires a different affordance structure than hook use because different 
relationships are implied between actor, tool and target. Therefore this result doesn't 
necessarily speak against the assumptions of our approach, provided that the affordance 
structures of stick use could be taken into account 
In order to find out if stick use may be responsible for the difference between 
Configurations d and e, we searched the data of successful children for stick use. In 
Configuration a to с the hook was used as a stick for 15% of the solutions but in 
Configuration d and e this occuired in 50% of the cases. 
For both tools, hook and stick, there are two higher-order complementarities to be 
realized. One concerning the reachability of the target by decreasing the distance 
between actor and target and as a condition for doing so the maintenance of spatial 
contact between tool and target. In the case of hook use, maintaining contact between 
hook and target in the crook part of the hook is realized by the shape of the crook part 
itself. Once the proper position of the target within the crook part of the hook is 
realized, then subsequently, the actor has to decrease the distance of a crook to himself 
by pulling a handle. Contrary for stick use. Here, maintaining the contact between stick 
and target and decreasing the distance between actor and target must be realized 
synchronously. Whereas decreasing distance of the target to the actor refers to a 
principally vertical movement, maintaining the contact requires a horizontal movement. 
The shape of a stick requires that the two must be realized at the same moment, 
resulting automatically into the sweeping movement characteristic of bringing the target 
within reach by a stick. These differences in temporal integration of lower-order 
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complementary relationships into higher-order affordance structures we called kind of 
temporal integration. It will be explored as a second source of complexity for the 
perception of the means character of a tool in Experiment 3. 
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Figure 5: Results of Experiment 1. Percentages of children who succeeded in 
Configurations a-e for the three groups (unsuccessful group, half way 
group and successful group) 
Our experimental procedure used a model to provide the child a demonstration of tool 
use in each configuration after initial failure to succeed. The significance of differences 
between the before and after a model was tested with Cochran's Q-Test (see Appendix 
3). For the unsuccessful group, the low percentage success does not increase. This 
group seems to be not ready to make use of the model information. For the successful 
group, most subjects succeed without model. For the half way group, there is a 
significant increase of success after a model for Configurations that are easy according 
to our theoretical description (Configurations a-c), but not for the more difficult ones 
(Configurations d-e). 
The role of modeling could be understood as a clarification of the information available 
from the configuration given (see Vygotsky, 1986). The complementary relationships a 
child has to anticipate in order to solve the respective tool use problem are realized in 
front of the child. We thus assume that the child is doing more than just imitating an 
action. The model helps to bring the relevant complementary relationships into focus. 
The child must be ready for this, in order to profit fremi the model. 
A prediction resulting from this assumption may distinguish the behavior of the child 
following the model from pure imitation behavior. Because a more complex 
configuration contains all affordances also involved in the easier configurations but not 
vice versa, a child successful in a certain configuration, with or without a model, is able 
successful 
group 
half-way 
group 
unsuccessful 
group 
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to anticipate all relevant complementary relationships. This implies that he or she will 
succeed in all the theoretically easier configurations. 
Expenment 2 
Hypothesis and method 
If success after a model requires the same capabilities of the perceptual system as 
success without model, both must imply the solution of all theoretically easier 
configurations. In order to test this prediction Experiment 2 was performed as a 
replication of Experiment 1 with a modified procedure: Instead of a random order of the 
configurations, a fixed order is used starting at the first trial with one of the theoretically 
most difficult configurations (Configurations e and d in Figure 2), followed by the 
others in decreasing order of difficulty (c, b, a). If the temporal integration demands 
determine the difficulty of Configurations a-e, then any child succeeding in a particular 
configuration (if necessary, after modeling) will also succeed in all following 
configurations without a model, because the model has helped the child to figure out the 
potential complementarities of a configuration, that are more complicated than those in 
all following ones. A model was given if the child after some time did not succeed. As 
in Experiment 1 first a small hint was given and if this didn't help, the solution was 
fully demonstrated by the person on who's lap the child was sitting. After a model the 
same configuration was presented ones more. 
Subjects This experiment took place in two nursery schools in the town of Nijmegen. 
Twelve children between 1.8 and 2.1 years old, 6 girls and 6 boys participated in the 
experiment. Parents and teachers had been contacted by an explanatory letter and had 
been asked for their permission. 
Results and Discussion 
In Table 3, successes and failures for all five Configurations a-e are shown for the 12 
children participating in this experiment. As predicted by our hypothesis, children 
succeeding after modeling in a particular configuration succeed without model in all the 
following configurations. There is not a single violation of this prediction in 60 trials. 
We may conclude that children's success with or without model means the ability to 
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anticipate the temporal integrated relationships of actor, tool and target, necessary for 
solving the respective task, not just imitating the behavior of the model. 
Table 3: Results of Experiment 2. 
Config. 
a 
b 
с 
d 
e 
Subj 
1 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
ect 
2 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
3 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
4 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
m 
5 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
m 
6 
+ 
+ 
+ 
m 
-
7 
+ 
+ 
+ 
m 
-
8 
+ 
+ 
+ 
-
-
9 
+ 
+ 
+ 
-
-
10 
+ 
+ 
m 
-
-
11 
+ 
+ 
-
-
-
12 
+ 
+ 
-
-
-
Note. Conf. = configuration; Successful solutions are indicated by "+", failure by "-"; 
successful solutions only after a model are indicated by "m". 
Summing up the results from the first two experiments, we found a group (called the 
half way group according to the results in Experiment 1) of children sensitive to our 
variations in task complexity. This group has an age range from 14 months to 25 
months. They solved up to 66% of the configurations given. There was no subject who 
succeeded in a configuration theoretically described as more complex and failed in a 
configuration theoretically described as less complex. At least for the half way group 
number of affoidances to be integrated temporally is a source of difficulty for 
perceiving the tool function of a hook in our experiments. 
Experiment 3 
Introduction and hypothesis 
It was assumed that besides according to number, affordance structures could also vary 
according to kind of temporal integration. In a sense, kind is a complexity criterion 
much more specific to our theoretical approach than number. Kind involves the 
temporal characteristics of the integration and is therefore more distinctive a 
characteristic of the event structure of action. 
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Von Hofsten & Rönnqvist (1988) showed how the temporal integration of effectivides 
like reaching and grasping develop in infants between 3 and 9 months. For 3-month-
old infants the reaching and grasping affordances were realized in a fixed order, one by 
one in a diachronous way. With the 9-month-old, they are realized in parallel in a 
smoothly integrated action. We could view this as a realization of a synchronously 
integrated affordance structure. 
Whereas the grasping could be realized by diachronous as well as by synchronous 
integration, there are cases where synchronous integration is necessary. For instance 
driving a car requires sometimes changing the gear and turning the driving wheel at the 
same moment 
According to our theory, synchronous integration is more complex than a diachronous 
one, not only for action, but also for perception. In the case of diachronous integration 
the relevant complementary relationships are separated in time by discontinuities of the 
event structure. The realization of one of these is the signal for the next one to begin. In 
the case of synchronous integration, however, one discontinuity in the event structure 
specifies more than one complementary relationship to be realized. The phenomenal 
event structure of an action whose possibility must be perceived is likewise subject to 
more specific constraints. So, as far as perception of tool affordance structures is 
concerned, the overall kind of temporal integration of lower-order affordances into a 
higher-order one may be used to predict for task difficulty. 
Experiment 3 was performed in order to pit kind of temporal integration against 
number. Two alternative solutions were contrasted for one task. The possibility of two 
alternative solutions was already observed for the configurations of Experiment 1. They 
could, in principle, be solved by hook or by stick use. An unexpected difference 
occurred in Experiment 1 between Configuration d and e was ascribed to stick 
affordance structures. Hook and stick affordance structures differ primarily in the kind 
of integration, hook affordance structures being diachronous and stick ones 
synchronous. Two second-order affordance structures must integrated synchronously, 
to perceive the possibility of the characteristic sweeping movement that brings the target 
within reach by a stick. One is the possibility of decreasing the distance between target 
and actor by a centripetal movement of the target. The other one is the ability to 
maintain the point of contact between stick and target, by means of a lateral movement 
As compared to kind, which is a property of an affordance structure, number is a 
property of its arguments and it is, therefore, a complexity of a hierarchically lower 
level. One might therefore expect kind-complexity to dominate over number-
complexity. In that case one would interpret the analytical hierarchy of the affordance 
structure as a hierarchical control structure with top-down control. Alternatively, 
bottom-up control would lead to the prediction that number-complexity dominates kind. 
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A third possibility is that there may be trade-off between number and kind of affordance 
structure. If so, we may expect the lower level number complexity sometimes to 
overrule the advantage of diachronous over synchronous dichotomy at higher level. 
Thus, a change in preference from hook use to stick use can be expected if stick use is 
much cheaper with respect to number complexity than hook use. 
Trade-off assumed between the two sources of complexity leads to the prediction of a 
critical point where preference for a more diachronous affordance structure with a 
relatively long sequence of affordances converts to a preference for a more 
synchronous affordance structure with less affordances to be integrated. We have at 
present no theoretical criterion for the position of this point. In the present experiment 
we will therefore determine this point empirically. 
Choice of configurations 
As our starting point, we took the configurations of Experiment 1, where stick 
solutions occurred to some extent. These are the Configurations b and d of Figure 2. 
Observation data on Experiment 1 revealed that for Configuration b the number of stick 
solutions was less than 10 % of the total whereas for Configuration d the number of 
stick solutions was more than 50 % of the total. We constructed variations of these 
configurations for our purpose. 
These, shown in Figure 6 had maximal variation on number for the hook affordance 
structures, but minimal for the stick ones. Hook and stick affordance structure in 
Configurations a, b and с have nearly equal number complexity, but differ in kind. For 
this configuration preference for hook use is predicted. For configurations d, e and f 
the diachronous kind solution, the hook is extremely disadvantageous with respect to 
number. For this configuration, stick use is predicted if there is trade-off between the 
levels. 
Description of the affordance structures. Figure 7 shows the complementary 
relations for hook (a) and stick (b). For hook use these are the inclination of the hook-
target pair with respect to the actor (O0), the orientation of the crook part of the hook 
with respect to the target (Ol); the contact between hook and target (02); and the height 
of the hook with respect to the target (03). For stick use the tool-target 
complementarities are the position of the stick above the target and the spatial contact 
between the two. 
For hook and stick use A
e
nd indicates the complementary relationship that correspond 
to the goal of the action, i.e. the reachability of the target. A4 and A3 respectivelly 
indicate the tool-target complementarity to be realized in order to realize A
en
d. Tables 4 
and 5 contain the tool-target complementarities (O) and actor-tool ones, or first-order 
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complementarities (A) that are needed. The temporal integration of these first-order 
complementarities into second-order affordance structures (A^) are shown in the last 
column. Finally, Table 6 contains the temporal integration of these into third-order 
affordance structures (A3) needed. Diachronous integration is indicated by a comma 
separating the lower-order complementarities and synchronous integration by a period. 
Table 7 summarizes the number complexity for both hook and stick use. Number has 
been split up into synchronously and diachronously integrated ones. The zeros in the 
column labelled "synchronous" for hook use indicate that all the hook affordance 
structures are of the diachronous kind. Configuration a, for instance, affords a 
sequence of actions: first, bringing the target within the crook part of the hook. Then 
pulling the hook towards the actor in order to bring the target within reach. The point of 
contact between hook and target is maintained because of the hook shape. All these 
affordance structures occur also in the diachronous structure of Configuration b, where 
in addition the right orientation of the crook part with respect to the target must be 
realized. In Configurations b and с as well as e and f the crook must be given a vertical 
inclinatio first with respect to the actor. 
In Table 7, the zeros for most of the diachronous stick affordance structures, show that 
the stick affordance structures are of the synchronous kind. Configurations e and f in 
Figure 6 differ only slightly from the complete synchronicity in the others, as their 
number complexity shows. Our description is based on lifting the stick and bringing it 
to the other side of the object, followed by a short "sweep". A completely synchronous 
affordance structure was possible for these configurations as well. Because of the 
actor's location the sweep than must have a wider turn than for the other 
configurations. 
The last column of Table 7 shows the difference in number between stick and hook 
use. It is low for Configurations a-c and high for Configurations d-e. The switch from 
hook to stick use is therefore expected to occur between Configurations с and e. 
Whether the predicted switch is going to occur exactly here cannot be predicted from 
our theoretical description. In the trade-off view this depends on the relative strength 
between kind and number in the transaction, which is unknown. 
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Figure 6: Configurarions from Experiment 3. 
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Figure 7: Possible or actual complementary relationships between tool and target in 
Configurations a-f for hook use (a) and for stick use (b). 
Table 4: First and second-order complementarities for the hook. Further explanations 
see text. 
actor-hook 
АО 
Al 
A2 
A3 
A4 
hook-target 
Oo - inclination 
Οι- orientation 
02 - contact 
Оз - height 
actor-target 
Aend 
A2 
(AO-OO) 
(Al.Ol) 
(A2.02) 
(A3.O3) 
(A4 Aend) 
о 
Table 5: First and second-order complementarities for the stick. Further explanations 
see text. 
actor-stick stick-target actor-target A 2 
Αι Οι-position (Αι.Οι) 
A2 Q2- contact (A2.O2) 
A3 Aend (A3.Aend) 
Table 6: Affordance structures for Configurations a-f according to hook and stick 
use. 
Hook affordance structure Stick affordance structure 
Aa3 ((A3.O3). (A4.A
en
d)) A
a
3 ((A2.O2). (A3.A
e
nd)) 
Ab3 ((A0.O0), (A3.O3), (A4.A
e
nd)) Ab3 ((A2.O2). (A3.Aend)) 
Ac3 ((A0.O0), (A3.O3), (A4.Aend)) Ac3 ((A1.O1), (A2.Q2). (A3.Acnd)) 
Ad3 ((A1.O1), (A2.O2), (A3.O3), (A4.Aend)) Ad3 ((A2.O2). (As.Aend)) 
Ae3 ((A0.O0), (A1.O1), (A2.O2), (A3.O3), (A4.A
e
nd)) Ac3 ((Αι.Οι), (A2.O2). (A3.Acnd)) 
Af3 ((Ao-Oo), (A1.O1), (A2.O2), (A3.O3), (A4.Acnd)) Af3 ((A2.O2). (A3.Aend)) 
Note. Diachronous integration is indicated by a "," to separate lower-order affordances 
and synchronous integration by a ".". 
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Table 7: Number complexity split out for diachronous and synchronous affordance 
structures. 
Configuration 
a 
b 
с 
d 
e 
f 
hook use 
diachronous 
2 
3 
3 
4 
5 
5 
synchronous 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
stick use 
diachronous 
0 
0 
1 
0 
1 
0 
synchronous 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
difference 
0 
1 
0 
2 
2 
3 
Note, "difference" = (Column 2+ Column 3) - (Column 4 +Column 5) 
Method. 
Subjects. This experiment was performed in four day-care centers in the Dutch towns 
of Nijmegen and Wychen. Parents and teachers had been contacted by letter, explaining 
the purposes of the experiment and asking for permission for the child's participation. 
Thirty-five young children between 17 and 48 months old participated in the 
experiment. 
Stimuli. Twelve configurations were used, the six configurations shown in Figure 6 
and their mirror image variations, in which left-hand side and right-hand side were 
exchanged. 
Material. The same plastic hooks as in Experiment 1 were used. The experimental 
toys were six small, plastic, 'squeaky' animals, about 10 cm in height and 6 cm in 
diameter (two differently coloured rabbits, two differently coloured doggies, a frog and 
a lion). In the training phase, two nonexperimental toys were used (a stuffed cloth dog 
or a rabbit). The experiment was performed at a table of normal children's height. On 
this table a perspex plate was placed with a grid engraved into the bottom, so that the 
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movements of hook and objects could be studied better in the video-recordings.The 
grid was hardly visible for the child. 
During the experimental session, the child was seated on the assistant experimentei's 
lap (a teacher or occasionally the mother). This was done in order to supply the child 
with a safe 'operating base' from where it might be less anxious to perform, as well as 
preventing the child from reaching too far across the table and obtain the object by 
reaching. 
Procedure. The experiment consisted of two phases. During Phase 1, the child was 
familiarized with the experimental setup. After the child had been seated, a 
nonexperimental toy was placed out of reach for the child. The child's attention was 
drawn towards this toy by the experimenter by saying: "Look what a nice rabbit 
(doggie). Would you like to play with it? Can you make the rabbit come to you?" The 
child in general showed interest in the toy by reaching for it, or by trying to climb on 
the table (which was prevented by the mother or nurse). The experimenter concluded: 
"The rabbit can't come towards you, can it?" Then, the toy is tied to a string which is 
within reach for the child. The child's attention was once more drawn towards the toy 
by pointing and saying: "Now can you make the rabbit come to you?" If the child 
showed no initiative, the mother or nurse pulled the string a little so that the toy started 
moving. If the child didn't react at all or became afraid (which happened once or twice) 
a cookie was given and the session was stopped. If the child pulled the tool and 
succeeded to obtain the toy, Phase 2 followed. 
Phase 2 was the experimental phase. The experimenter presented one of the six 
configurations on the table in front of the child. For each of the configurations, a 
different toy was used. She said: " Look what a nice rabbit (doggie, lion, frog). Can 
you make it come to you?" If the child dropped the tool, or the object fell off the table, 
or if it became otherwise impossible for the child to acquire the object with the tool, the 
configuration was presented a second time. If on two successive occasions the child 
did not succeed in acquiring the object with the tool, the pre experimental configuration 
was presented again. This was done to supply the child with a success experience to 
prevent that failure in the preceding configuration would distract the child from trying 
the next configuration. Every time Configuration a was presented, it was solved so it 
fulfilled the aim of providing the child a success experience. 
After the toy was obtained (either in experimental trial or in Configuration a), the child 
was allowed some playing time. Before the next presentation the child was asked to 
give back the toy to the mother/nurse or the experimenter and it was put aside on the 
table "... so it can look and see what you are doing". If at any time during the session 
the child lost interest in the procedure, the toy was replaced by a cookie. This appeared 
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to be sufficient for the child to regain its attention and complete the session. More than 
one cookie was never needed. In this manner, six configurations were presented 
successively to each child. The order of the configurations was a prearranged random 
one, with left-right orientation for the hook alternating, and balancing the number of 
presentations of a left or right version of a configuration. After the child completed the 
six experimental configurations, he or she was given a cookie and a balloon in reward. 
Scoring. Only the results of the first presentation of each configuration were scored. 
We did this in order to be sure that the child's action depended on the configuration 
presented and not on subsequent changes providing additional information. Apart from 
the behavioral aspects such as reaching, rotating, pulling, throwing etc. we registered 
whether the child was able to effectively acquire the toy using the tool (success-failure), 
and whether the tool was used as a hook or a stick. We only scored an event as hook-
use if the crook of the tool was explicitly used as the part with which the toy was 
controlled and moved. That is, if the child explicitly and intentionally placed the crook 
of the tool around the toy. All other use was scored as stick-use. 
Results and Discussion 
Comparison between hook and stick use. The trade-off hypothesis predicted a 
shift in preferred usage from hook to stick. In order to test this hypothesis, frequency 
differences between hook and stick use were tested with the chi-square procedure for 
the comparison of two dependent samples (see Table 8). As shown in Figure 8, there is 
a preference for hook use in Configurations a-c and a preference for stick use in 
Configuration f. These results are in accordance with the hypothesis of trade-off 
between number and kind. They could not have been explained from either number or 
kind alone. 
Provided that the affordances to be integrated do not differ in number, a diachronous 
kind of temporal integration is preferred that leads to hook use in Configurations a-c. 
Hook and stick use are equally preferred in Configurations d and e. For these, the 
difference in number between hook and stick use equals three. 
In sum, as soon as the difference in number increases above two, the advantage of the 
lesser number outweights the disadvantage of the synchronous kind of integration and 
preference turns to stick solutions. This suggests that the trade-off uses as principle, to 
shift strategy if the task complexity is raised by two. 
The preferences observed, however, could only indicate trade-off between number and 
kind if the shift in preference is actually observed within subjects. If our sample would 
consist of two groups only, one always preferring stick use and the other hook use, the 
61 
result would be an artefact. The reason for choosing hook or stick then would be 
independent of the relationship between the affordance structures. We were able to 
distinguish, however, three groups of subjects (see Figure 9). The largest group 
switches between hook and stick use (n = 18), the second group uses the hook only 
(n = 13) and the third group uses the stick only (n = 4). Figure 9 suggests that the 
trade-off observed in Figure 8 between hook and stick solutions is entirely due to the 
switching group. This, because the frequencies no longer show an interaction when the 
scores of the switching group are removed from the data. 
Probably the non-switching subjects were fixated to their first solution. They might 
have been looking for a similar one in all following configurations. These subjects are 
in a way "blind" for other solutkms. This is the kind of behavior described by Duncker 
(1945) as functional fixation. An interesting result is, therefore, that for the two non-
switching groups the percentage success (64.4 %) is smaller than for the switching 
group (76.8%). 
Table 8: Results of Experiment 3: Differences in frequency of hook vs. stick use 
tested with the chi-square. 
Configuration chi-square ρ 
a 72.2 s. 
b 4.4 s. 
с 4.4 s. 
d 1.3 n.s. 
e 0.1 n.s. 
f 5.4 s. 
Note. Significances were tested with the chi-square test; s = significant; n.s. = not 
significant; ρ for chi-square 3.84, df = 1, alpha = .05, one-tailed test; η = 35 
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Figure 8: Absolute frequency of the total usage, stick use and hook use for all 
subjects (n = 35) in Configurations a-f of Experiment 3 
frequency 
solution 
·•- switching 
•o- hook only 
* • stick only 
b с d 
Configuration 
Figure 9: Absolute frequency of solutions for the group switching between hook and 
stick use ( η = 18), the group using the hook only (n = 13) and the group 
using the hook as stick only (n = 4) in Configurations a-f of Experiment 3 
Comparison within hook and stick solutions. Within-group differences for 
hook and stick use respectively in Configurations a-e were tested with the Mc-Nemar 
chi-square procedure (see Table 9 a, b). The within-group differences for both, hook 
and stick use are not predictable from number only. Only for Configurations a, b and с 
where hook use is strongly preferred, the results conform to the predictions concerning 
number for hook use (Configurations a > b = c). Neither the stick solutions in 
Configurations a, b and c, nor the hook solutions in Configurations d, e and f 
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conformed to any patterns. We might have expected that they followed the complexity 
of the respective stick and hook affoidance structures. But these solutions, being not-
preferred ones, were probably too small in number to reveal any pattern. Together with 
the failures, they are simply a remainder. The variability over the configurations within 
hook solutions is higher than that between stick solutions. This conformed to the 
predictions, because the affordance structures for hook use were the more strongly 
varied in number complexity. 
Table 9: Results of Experiment 3: differences between number of hook and stick 
solutions for Configurations a-f. 
a) hook use 
Configuration 
a vs. b 
b vs. с 
с vs. d 
d vs. e 
e vs. f 
chi -square 
8.0 
0.0 
10.0 
7.0 
5.0 
Ρ 
s. 
η.s. 
s. 
s. 
s. 
b) stick use 
Configuration 
a vs. b 
b vs. с 
cvs. d 
d vs. e 
e vs. f 
chi -square 
7.0 
1.0 
1.0 
2.0 
5.0 
Ρ 
s. 
n.s. 
n.s. 
n.s. 
s. 
Note. Significances were tested with the McNemar chi-square Test; s = significant; 
n.s. = not significant; ρ for chi-square 2.71, df = 1, alpha = .05, one-tailed test; 
η = 35. 
In order to control for a left-right effect of the orientation of Configurations a -e, the 
differences in frequency of the left-right orientation were tested separately for hook and 
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stick use with the chi-square procedure for the comparison of two dependent samples. 
There are no significant differences between the left and right orientation of 
Configurations a-e, neither for hook nor for stick use (Significances of Chi-square 
were tested against equal chance; ρ for chi-square 11.1, df = 5, alpha = .05; η = 35). 
Total number of solutions. Differences in total number of solutions compared 
over Configurations a-f were tested with the McNemar chi-square Test, one tailed (see 
Table 10). The number of solutions doesn't differ between Configurations a, b and с 
and it also doesn't differ between d, e and f. But for the a, b, с group these are 
significantly more solutions than for the d, e, f group. The theoretical differences 
within a, b and с and within d, e and f are minimal, but between these two groups 
they are maximal. This result fits the trade-off hypothesis. It could not be explained in 
terms of neither number complexity of hook nor stick solutions alone. 
Table 10: Results of Experiment 3: within group differences in total number of 
solutions for Configurations a-f. 
Configuration 
a vs. b 
b vs. с 
с vs. d 
dvs. e 
e vs. f 
chi -square 
1.0 
1.0 
9.0 
1.0 
0.0 
Ρ 
η.s. 
η.s. 
s. 
η.s. 
η.s. 
Note. Significances were tested with the McNemar chi-square Test; s = significant; 
n.s. = not significant; ρ for chi-square 2.71, df = 1, alpha = .05, one-tailed 
test; η = 35 
Conclusion 
The existence of a stick solution as an alternative to a hook solution has to be taken into 
account if affoidance structures are used to determine the difficulty of our tasks. Our 
experiments demonstrate that this alternative solution is sometimes preferred, even 
though it is theoretically more demanding in terms of kind of temporal integration. Kind 
therefore seems to be traded off against the other theoretical source of complexity, viz. 
number of affoidances to be integrated. The trade-off suggests heteraichical control of 
the preference for an affordance structure. This, because the factor kind could be 
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identified with a higher level of description of the system than number, and the 
preferences are traded off between these two levels. 
The unexpected differences between Configuration d and e from Experiment 1 could 
now be explained by comparing them to Configurations a and d from the present 
experiment. In both pairs of configurations, the preference changes from hook to stick. 
So in Experiment 1 hook use affordance structures must have been dominated in 
Configurations d and e by stick use ones and this affordance structures influenced the 
total number of solutions. 
The results of Experiment 2 are more crucial than those of Experiment 1 for theories 
that assume task-specific variations in difficulty resulting from either memory load or 
processing load. These could somehow be applied successfully to the data of 
Experiment 1, because they could easily assume load to increase with number 
complexity. Kind, however, cannot be understood so easily without taking the causal 
structure of a possible event into account 
General Discussion 
We are aware of the preliminary character of our analysis of complex action. 
Nevertheless we hope to provide set the initial steps in a discussion on that topic. We 
started from the assumption that complex actions are guided by perception as described 
by Gibson's (1979) affordance concept. This view was applied to tool use. For 
becoming a tool, an object must be handled by an actor in relation to other objects or 
substances. Tool use therefore was defined as performing an action on a target by 
performing an action on a tool. The action on the tool is embedded in the action on the 
target. In order to account for the role of perception in these hierarchically embedded 
actions, we proposed a higher-order affordance structure concept, with which these 
actions were regarded as complex events, in which the actor participates. To do so, he 
should be able to perceive the possibility of realizing a hierarchically integrated structure 
of mutually constraining complementarities. Besides complementary relationships 
between actor and environment there are also complementary relationships between 
objects to be taken in account. In the case of tool use the actor has to manipulate tool-
target complementarities in order to reach a certain actor-target complementarity. Each 
complementarity at lower-order level has a complementary relation to an affordance at 
higher-order level. The higher-order affordance structure could be said to organize the 
action. The temporal integration is mirrored in the event structure of action. 
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We were able to derive predictions regarding the difficulty of tool use in certain 
configurations from the complexity of the affordance structures involved. Structural 
and temporal sources of complexity were distinguished. The structural complexity 
source was specified as number of elements to be integrated at a certain level in an 
affordance structure, the temporal source was the kind (diachronous vs. synchronous) 
of the integration. In our experiments it was shown that the actions of infants and 
children in tool use were sensitive to both forms of complexity. The difficulty of 
performing or anticipating tool use in different situations was generally in accordance 
with the complexity predictions. 
Our higher-order affordance structure concept was able to bring the threefold relation 
between actor tool and target into play, preserving the duality principle. Reduced to 
three isolated two-fold relationships, it would be impossible to specify the character of 
tool use as mediated action. A tool is both, an object acted upon by the actor and acting 
on the target. 
With the higher-order affordance structure concept, the object to be identified as tool is 
constrained by the effectivities of the actor and the target and the desired relation of the 
actor with the target This was called the tool function. We argued that the information 
minimally needed in order to perceive the tool function depends on the event to be 
produced by action. Therefore the implementation of the suggestion to treat the tool 
function as a complex affordance structure differs in its consequences from the point of 
view of Shaw & Turvey (1981) and Kugler, Shaw, Vincente & Kinsella-Shaw (1990). 
These authors claim that for action there is objective information in form of a unique 
specification of a situation as needed. In our view, however, whatever information 
enables action is information for an affordance (see also Costali, 1986 and Van 
Leeuwen & van Leeuwen, submitted). 
Assumptions about temporal and structural integration of affordances into the higher-
order affordance structure of the tool allows for possible alternative realizations of it by 
simply integrating the same components differently. An object sometimes was used as a 
stick and sometimes as a hook, in order to realize the same goal. The emergence of rival 
solutions could therefore be used as an argument for the higher-order affordance 
structure. On the basis of complexity it was possible to predict not only the occurrence 
but also the preference for one of the possible alternative ways in which affordances 
had to be integrated. 
A restriction on our results originates from the fact that in our discussion of possible 
alternative explanations, we have entirely focused on an unresolved issue in the 
previously mentioned literature; viz. the role of spatial contact. Köhler (1917), Bates et 
al. (1980) and Brown (1990) all suggest that spatial contact between tool and target 
facilitates the detection of the tool function. But all these authors fail to provide a reason 
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for that. A more specifically described rival account, found in the literature, was the 
contact hypothesis, which assumed that spatial contact between target and tool makes 
them being perceived as one object. This was the only explanation from the tool use 
literature that is sufficently specific to become testable. It was dismissed, however, in 
Experiment 1 as in conflict with the data. With our description, it was possible to 
explain why the contact hypothesis works in some cases and breaks down in others. 
Yet, other alternatives could be developed in the framework of mental imagery and 
cognition (Piaget, 1971; Pick, 1988; Shepard, 1984). A principled discussion of their 
views falls beyond the scope of this paper, because it would require intensive exegesis 
in order to apply their conflicting insights to tool use and compare them to our views 
(see Dean, 1990 for a review). We will give here only one example of how our results 
could provide interesting questions for the issue of mental imagery. Piaget & Inhelder 
(1971) assume that a qualitative change occurs during development in the structure of 
mental images. According to their experimental results, children in pre-school age are 
able to construct initial and sometimes end-states of movements and transformations, 
but not ordered series of intervening states. The ability to foresee these emerges around 
seven or eight years. However, our results show that children as young as 2 and 3 
years old are able to foresee mediating steps in a proper sequence. 
The difference in results could be due to a difference in method. The experimental task 
in Piagets mental imagery research is imagery itself. Children are asked to imagine (or 
to draw) how a certain object would look like if it changes its position in a certain way. 
By contrast, in our tool use task mental imagery could be a means for anticipating an 
action that is needed to reach an end-state. Probably this kind of paradigm could open 
new ways of investigating imagery. 
Despite restrictions on our results, there are issues that can be clarified already on 
account of our present results. This regards the work of Bates et al. (1980) and Brown 
(1990). These authors agree in their view that the ability to use tools is based on 
cognitive functions which require the mastery of abstract, deep structure rules. Brown 
argues that transfer is mediated by similarity between situations according to the 
underlying causal structure even in infancy. She examined in her experiments young 
childrens' preference for a tool out of a series of objects. These were varied with 
respect to relevant and irrelevant properties concerning the intended function of pulling. 
Children selected objects with preference according to properties that afford pulling and 
not to features irrelevant for the task. She interpreted this result as in support of her 
view that "even young children show insightful learning and transfer on the basis of 
deep structural principles, rather than mere reliance on salient perceptual features..." 
(p. 130). For explaining the same results, however, we need assume only that relevant 
information in the context of this task is picked up and irrelevant information not, or not 
Chapter 2 71 
necessarily. The relevant information, i.e. the higher-order affordance structures, 
however, is not necessarily less perceptual than the irrelevant one; a consequence of our 
view is that the effort to distinguish between salient perceptive features and a deeper, 
cognitive structure becomes meaningless. 
The relevance of Brown's work lies in showing that, contrary to assumptions in earlier 
literature (Duncker, 1945; Gick & Holyoak, 1980), even very young children are 
capable of transfer. This is valid, provided that the principles involved are part of the 
child's practical experience. From our results we would argue that what is called 
"transfer of a cognitive rule" (Brown, 1990) is merely the perception of the same 
affordance structure in all situations varying over action irrelevant properties. A child 
solving the tool use task in one of the configurations from Experiment 1 may be unable 
to perform the next one if this requires a more complex affordance structure. But she 
will be able to solve all situations which require the same or a less complex affordance 
structure (but e.g. with different colour or texture of the attributes). For these 
configurations we observed what could be called "transfer". In this sense transfer is a 
measure of what is perceived and depends on the complexity of affordance structures 
needed in order to act successfully. As shown in our experiments, children seem to be 
able to perceive less complex affordance structures earlier in development than more 
complex ones. Transfer can only occur with respect to affordance structures subjects 
already are capable of perceiving. This could explain why age dependency was found 
for transfer learning. 
Mastery of tasks in our view is context-bound, because no abstract rules are being 
learned. Action is determined by grasp of a specific affordance structure sufficient for 
solving a specific tool use task. For instance, if an affordance structure (e.g. involving 
a hook-target relationship) is already realized, there is no need to take it into account. 
The child can just exploit the given relationship, without being aware of it. Another 
illustration of this sufficiency principle is the tool use behaviour observed most early in 
development, viz. pulling a string attached to an object (Bates et al. 1980). Here, it is 
obvious that the child doesn't need the information how this complementary 
relationship between string and target was realized. Independently of what the actor 
does, the string remains attached. 
Knowledge of an underlying causal structure, such as the physical laws guiding solid 
objects that keeps the rope attached to the string is not necessary, in our view, to 
perform this specific task. Clearly, it is not sufficient either. We assume that the grasp 
of the affordance structure specific to that situation is sufficient. On the other hand, the 
higher-order levels of the affordance structures may be less context bound than their 
lower-order arguments This suggests that a higher-order structure could ultimately be 
used to describe embodied knowledge of a law. 
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Appendix 1 
Observation categories: 
reaching: stretching the arm towards the target 
success: obtaining the target independently with the hook 
success by using the hook as hook: the target is within the crook pan of the hook 
success by using the hook as stick: the target is in contact with the hook, but not at the 
crook pan 
Appendix 2. 
Results of Experiment 1: Within group differences in success for the half-way group. 
Confi- chi-square ρ 
guraiion 
a:b 2.0 n.s. 
a :c 10.0 s. 
b : c 8.0 s. 
c :d 5.0 s. 
d : e 4.0 s. 
Note. Significances were tested with the McNemar chi-square Test; s = significant; 
n.s. = not significant; ρ for chi-square 3.84, df = 1, alpha = .05; η = 35; two-
tailed test 
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Appendix 3 
Results of Experiment 1: Differences in success with or without a model for 
Configurations a-e for the half-way group. 
Confi- chi-square ρ 
guration 
a 11.0 0.01 
b 7.0 0.01 
с 6.0 0.05 
d 3.0 n.s. 
e - n.s. 
Note. Significances were tested with the McNemar chi-square Test; s = significant; 
n.s. = not significant; ρ for chi-square 3.84, df = 1, alpha = .05; η = 35; two-
tailed test 
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Developmental aspects of perceiving higher-order affordance 
structures 
Lieselotte van Leeuwen, 
& 
Ad Smitsman 
University of Nijmegen, The Netherlands 
The concept of higher-order affordance structures was introduced in earlier studies as a means to 
describe development in the perception of tool functions. Higher-order affordance structures aie a 
means to control the temporal integration of lower-order affordances/complementarities in 
complex action. The complexity of the integration according to the description was used to predict 
the preference for a tool function. In order for this concept to form the basis of an account of 
development, it is of importance that the criteria for complexity are unaffected by age and task 
variation. These predictions are put to a test in the present study. 
Three experiments were performed in order to test preference predictions from complexity for 
different age groups and tasks. Experiments 1 and 2 showed that preferences remain invariant 
accross age. Experiment 3 showed that preferences vary in accordance with complexity predictions, 
across tasks of which the surface properties are similar, but the functional relations differ. Some 
phenomena firom literature were discussed, concerning tasks that require the selection of one object 
for the manipulation of another. It was argued that complexity of higher-order affordance structures 
could, in principle, explain these results. 
Introduction 
Humankind is characterized by extensive tool use. The emergence of tool use enables 
the child to overcome the limitations on her action capacities resulting from her 
endowment. The acquisition of tool use in early childhood therefore is an important 
phase in development. Tool use may begin as trial and error. At some point in her 
development, however, the child acquires the capacity to plan the use of an object as a 
tool. This capacity requires, among others, the ability to perceive the tool function of 
that object 
A framework for describing the perceptual requirements at this level of performance 
was proposed in van Leeuwen, Smitsman, & van Leeuwen (submitted). The 
investigation was based on the ecological approach to perception as founded by James 
Gibson (1966;1979). While in this approach perception is assumed to anticipate 
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action, action constraints are mirrored in perception. The functional meaning of objects 
and events is available to the perceiver in the ambient array of light. " Affordances of a 
given place in the environment establish for an individual what actions are possible 
there and what the consequences of those actions are" (Heft, 1989, p.3). Affordances 
describe a potential relationship between properties of the environment and those of an 
individual perceiver. For example, graspability is an affordance of an object, which 
describes a complementary relationship between physical properties of that object (e.g. 
its size) and biomechanical properties of the actor's "grasping system" (e.g. handspan). 
This means that one object can afford graspability to an adult person but not to a child 
because the object is e.g. too big to be grasped. Affordances thus are properties of the 
environment scaled in reference to an individual. 
Affordances of tools are special cases in so far as a complementarity between actor and 
tool-object can only be a tool affordance, if complementary relations between actor and 
target and between tool and target aie taken into account. A hammer as a tool is chosen 
e.g. in order to hammer a nail into a wall and not just for hammering. The hammer 
must be light enough to handle but at the same time strong enough to drive the nail. As 
argued extensively in van Leeuwen et al. (submitted), the interdependence of these 
relations themselves is of importance for the tool function and therefore must be 
perceived by an actor. The weight of the hammer determines how it can be handled and 
also how much force the actor can and must employ in order to drive the nail. 
To describe such constraining relationships between complementarities, it was assumed 
that at first-order level there are affordances which are akin to the ones familiar from 
Gibsonian literature. Additionally, at first-order level there are complementary 
relationships between objects, such as tool and target Because there is no actor 
involved we cannot call them affordances. We instead referred to them merely as 
complementarities. With these as basis, a concept of higher-order affordance structures 
was introduced. The definition is recursive, allowing first-order affordances, second-
order affordance structures, third-order ones etc. The higher-order affordance structure 
concept is an extension of the traditional affordance concept. As will be illustrated, it 
could be applied to describe the interrelatedness of lower-order complementarities, 
needed to describe the role of perception in complex actions such as tool use. 
What makes an object a tool is its subordination into a hierarchically organized action 
(Greenfield, 1991; Werner, 1957). The subordination has a structural and a temporal 
aspect. Structurally, affordance structures of tools consist of a nested structure of 
complementary relationships between actor and environment and between objects in the 
environment. In order to realize the goal of the action, these complementarities must be 
placed in an appropriate temporal organization. Whatever has to be realized first is 
subordinated to the goal which is realized last. Therefore an actor on a global level has 
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to envisage the event in its entirity. The higher-order affordance structure specifies the 
tool use action as a nested event structure. 
Experiments reported in van Leeuwen et al. (submitted) illustrated the applicability of 
the higher-order affordance structure concept. In these experiments, young children 
were presented a hook as tool to obtain a distant object. Configurations a-e in Figure 1 
were subsequently presented, consisting of a tool and a target. The initial spatial 
position of the tool with respect to the target varied. It was shown that the difficulty of 
perceiving the tool function was not dependent on the relative spatial position of tool 
and target per se, but on the complexity of the higher-order affordance structure. 
r\ r\ r^ г\ 
Figure 1: Configurations used by Van Leeuwen, et al. (submitted). 
The present study investigates the possibility of applying the higher-order affordance 
structure concept within an account of human development. Perceptual development 
was characterized by E. Gibson (1988) as a process of increasing differentiation of 
relational properties of actor and environment. More and more specific actor-
environment relationships emerge and become integrated in a hierarchical structure of 
increasing depth. We aim at specifying this as the capacity to perceive increasingly 
complex higher-order affordance structures. Such a view on development requires that 
the criteria for "complexity of a higher-order affordance structure" remain invariant 
over age. Therefore the study of the generality of our complexity criteria is directly 
motivated by our interest in child development. 
Three sources of complexity of higher-order affordance structures were proposed in 
van Leeuwen et al. (submitted). One source of complexity regards our most general 
Chapter 3 83 
assumption, the order, which refers to the depth of nesting of a higher-order affordance 
structure. It is illustrated by the fact that tool use in general is a complex action that 
occurs relatively late in development. In our view, this is because tool use requires the 
integration of complementary relationships between actor and tool, actor and target and 
tool and target. Therefore, this form of complexity may be useful for distinguishing 
tool use from other behaviours. In our present study, however, we wish to compare 
different tool use configurations for their complexity. 
For doing so, two other sources remain, which parallel the distinction between 
structural and temporal integration within an affordance structure of a given order. One 
referred to the number of lower-order affordances to be assembled into a higher-order 
structure. E.g. in Configuration d of Figure 1, an actor has first to flip over the hook 
and to bring the hook in spatial contact with the target within the crook part of the hook 
before he can realize the tool function which is pulling the target within reach. For 
Configuration a in Figure 1, however, just pulling the hook is enough for obtaining 
the target. The difficulty of perceiving the tool function was assumed to be proportional 
to the number of complementary relationships to be integrated. 
The other source refers to the kind of temporal integration of lower-order affordances 
into a higher-order affordance structure. Diachronous and synchronous kind of 
integration were distinguished. Intermediate forms were admitted. Diachronous means 
that different complementary relationships can be realized sequentially, one by one. In 
contrast, synchronous integration requires the realization of different complementarities 
in parallel. Parallel realization of different relationships requires more extensive control 
than realization one by one. E.g. hook use in Configuration e realizes the different 
relationships to obtain the target in sequence, diachronously; first the crook is placed in 
the proper position for pulling. While pulling, the position of the target is maintained 
by the crook itself. But consider a solution of the same task by using the tool object as 
a stick; by using it directly to move the target towards the actor and at the same time 
preventing it from sliding away from the present point of contact with the tool. The, 
relatively, simplest way to combine these requirements is a circular, sweeping 
movement of the tool. 
Development in our view requires growth in ability to assemble increasingly complex 
affordance structures. The seemingly small variations in configurations between 
Configurations a-e in Figure 1, affected the complexity of the affordance structures. As 
a consequence, children able to solve the theoretically easier configurations were still 
unable to solve the more difficult ones. But once a child was able to solve a certain 
configuration, all the easier ones could be solved too. 
Van Leeuwen et al. (submitted) distinguished three groups of children. Children in the 
youngest group (9 to 12 months) ignored the tool object and instead just tried to reach 
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for the target. For a group between 14 and 24 months old, the ability to perceive the 
tool function in different confìgurations depended on the relative spatial position of 
hook and target (see Figure 1). They failed in confìgurations of which the higher-order 
affordance structures contained a large number of lower-order ones and succeeded in 
the configurations which required a lesser number. The oldest group from 25 months 
up to 3.8 years succeeded in all configurations. It was concluded that at least children 
who are in the course of learning tool use are sensitive to these complexity sources. 
But, strictly speaking, these results could not be generalized to the older group. 
Percentages correct were caught between a floor effect (the youngest group unable to 
use the tool) and a ceiling effect (the older ones solving all the configurations). 
Measuring percentages success, leaves no possibility to check if subjects who solve all 
tool use configurations still might have experienced the difficulty of the configurations 
in accordance with their theoretical complexity. Preference studies, however, provide 
this possibility. We may predict the preference among two possible actions, which 
both lead to the realization of the actors goal. We expect that the solution will be 
preferred that imposes the least complex affordance structure, even if subjects could 
easily perform the action that leads to the realization of the more complex affordance. In 
addition, the strength of the preference is expected to be proportional to the difference 
in complexity between the alternatives. 
In our view, the description would be of little value, however, if it applies only to 
subjects who are in the course of learning to use tools. Therefore the first purpose of 
this article is to investigate if the description applies to different age groups. We will 
report two experiments, studying the preferences among alternative solutions for 
different populations of older children, who could be assumed to be able to use the 
tools in Congifurations a-e successfully. 
Another issue concerning the generality of our description is, whether it also applies to 
other tool use tasks than those of van Leeuwen et al. (submitted). This was investigated 
by using the configurations from Figure 1, but a different task. Changing the task 
means that some complementary relationships between actor, tool and target that were 
irrelevant before now become relevant and vice versa. Therefore, the preferences 
should change accordingly. By contrast, if only surface, task-unrelated (e.g. 
geometrical) properties of the configuration would determine its complexity, we would 
expect unchanged preferences accross tasks. 
This study on the generality of the higher-order affordance structure concept will be 
completed by presenting some previously unresolved issues from tool use literature 
together with our explanation and by showing how some tasks from diagnostic tests on 
development of manipulative action capacity could thus be interpreted. 
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Experiment 1 
Introduction. 
Tool use configurations were constructed, each consisting of a hook and two identical 
targets. The confìgurations are combinations of ones from Figure 1. In this way only 
one solution is possible at a time, but there is a choice between two alternative 
solutions. This allows the study of preference for a solution. It was expected from the 
affordance structure hypothesis that children will prefer the solution which is 
theoretically least complex. Moreover, the strength of preference was expected to be 
similar to the percentages solution for these configurations for the younger children in 
our earlier experiment 
For the configurations in Figure 1 complexity was predicted in van Leeuwen et al. 
(submitted) as the result of a dynamical interplay of the complexity sources number and 
kind. Both affected the percentage correct for younger children in the previous 
experiment. They were traded off against each other, the synchronous solution was 
sometimes preferred if it was more parsimonous in terms of number. Therefore, both 
number and kind complexity had to be taken into account. For a specification of these 
complexities for all configurations, see Appendix 1. According to the theoretical 
differences in task complexity and the earlier results we expect the following 
preferences: Configuration a > b > c > d > e . 
The chosen method of using only one hook and two targets for a trial prevents the 
presentation of the complete set of 10 possible pairs out of Configurations a-e from 
Figure 1. There are no trials comparing Configurations a, b, с and respectively 
Configurations d and e to each other directly. These configurations can be compared 
indirectly by comparing preferences of Configurations a, b, с with respect to 
Configuration e or d in isolation. Only in this way could preference data be obtained. It 
was, for instance, impossible to use two hook-target configurations simultaneously and 
let children choose the preferred one. Three to four years old children became confused 
by those choices because there are too many things to be compared. Usually they 
grasped both hooks and tried to obtain the targets, which failed. Presenting one hook 
only makes a comparison more implicit to performance. The age group 3 to 4 years old 
is especially of interest for us because this group was successful in performing all 
configurations in the previous experiment. 
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A still older group of children who are able to perform the preference task even with 
two hooks was tested in Experiment 2. For this group the whole set of possible pairs 
out of Configurations a to e in Figure 1 was presented. 
Configuration o/d Configuration a/e 
r*\ 
г^ 
Configuration b/d Configuration b/e 
Г>1 r^ 
Configuration c/d Configuration c/e 
Figure 2: Configurations used in Experiment 1. 
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Method 
Subjects. Twenty-eight subjects in the range of 3;0-5;0 years of age participated in 
the experiment with their parents' consent 
Stimuli. The six experimental tool use configurations from Figure 2 were used. To 
each configuration corresponded a mirror-image variant, which could be obtained from 
the Figures by reflecting them around the vertical axis. This variation is indicated as 
left-right orientation of the hook. 
Material. Plastic hooks were used as tools, about 60 cm long, approximately 12 mm 
cross-section and with a weight of 75 g. Targets were three different pairs of identical 
rubbery animals, about 10 cm in diameter. The experiment was performed at a 1.20 X 
2 m table adjusted to normalize children's location. Children were standing in front of a 
table on a flag-stone which marked the middle position. The whole setting is shown in 
Figure 3. 
Procedure. Each child was first allowed to explore the hook in order to become 
familiar with it. The experimenter asked the child if it would like to have a cookie. 
None of the subjects refused, so as a next question, the experimenter asked, putting a 
cookie out of reach for the child on the otherwise empty table: "can you reach this 
cookie?" If the answer was negative, appropriately, the experiment continued; if the 
child gave an affirmative answer, the experimenter encouraged the child to obtain the 
cookie, until it was clear that it was impossible for the child to do so. The experimenter 
gave the hook to the child and asked: "now can you do something to make the cookie 
come to you?" After an affirmative answer given by each child, the child was allowed 
to do so by using the hook. This cookie was laid apart for the child, within its reach. In 
the experimental phase following, as target three pairs of respectively two identical 
rubbery animals were used. Each trial began with distracting the child with a picture 
book. Meanwhile, one of the configurations from Figure 6 was placed on the table by 
the experimenter. The child then was allowed to use the hook to bring one of the 
animals within reach, making sure not to interfere with the child's choice. All children 
thus were presented all six experimental configurations in random order. Left-right 
orientation of the hook was alternated within subjects, and balanced between them. For 
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all subjects each of the three pairs of rubbery animals was used for two times, 
randomized over targets. 
border of the 
within reach area 
О 
child 
Figure 3: Experimental setting used in Experiment 1 
Results and discussion 
As shown in Table 1, the order of observed preferences is perfectly in accordance with 
the theoretical expected order. This may suggest that subjects capable to solve all 
configurations, also have a preference according to the theoretical complexity of the 
affordance structures. 
Significances of differences in preference per configuration were tested with a one-
group Chi-square test against equality. Except for Configuration c/d the differences for 
all configurations where significantly different from equality (see Table 2). 
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Table 1: Results of Experiment 1. η = 28. 
Configuration Preferences 
a/d 
a/e 
b/d 
c/d 
cfe 
Expected 
a 
a 
b 
b 
с 
с 
Observed 
a 
a 
b 
b 
с 
с 
Observed Percentages 
89.5 
96.4 
78.5 
89.5 
69.6 
75.0 
Table 2: Results of Experiment 1. The columns contain for every configuration the 
frequencies of realization of the two alternatives; the expected frequency for 
equal preference; the chi-square for df = 27; the significance level of the chi-
square test against equal probability of realization 
Confi­
guration 
m 
ah 
W 
b/e 
Co 
c/e 
part 
a 
a 
b 
b 
с 
с 
obseived 
ftequency 
25 
27 
22 
25 
19 
21 
part 
d 
e 
d 
e 
d 
e 
observed 
frequency 
3 
1 
6 
3 
8 
7 
expected f chi-square 
for 50% df=27 
17.29 
24.14 
9.14 
17.29 
3.57 
7.00 
Ρ 
.0001 
.0001 
.0025 
.0001 
.0588 
.0082 
frequency ,
 5 
preference 
Configuration 
Figure 4: Experiment 1. Mean percentage preference for Configurations a to e, 
calculated from pairwise choices. 
An additional result is that the preference for Configuration a is stronger than for 
Configurarions b and с when paired with Configuration d. The same holds for the 
preference relations of Configurations a, b and с compared to Configuration e (see 
Table 2). 
In sum, differences in preference are obtained in accordance with differences in 
integration demands. 
The results indicate that the preferences of older children are in accordance with what 
was easier for the younger children. Therefore, not only children in the process of 
learning to use tools act in accordance with the complexity of the respective affordance 
structure, but also the older ones. 
Differences in preference between Configuration a,b and с and respectively between 
Configuration d and e can not be tested directly. A preference comparison between all 
possible pairs out of Configurations a to e would be important in order to confirm the 
results of this Experiment 
Yet, it could be argued that still older, more skilled children no longer perceive 
differences between configurations in terms of our affordance structures. For them 
perfonning such hook tasks seems much more automaticly. Differences between 
configurations should not be noticed. Therefore, Experiment 2 is performed with a still 
older group of children. 
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Experiment 2 
Introduction, hypothesis 
The present experiment examined children in primary-school age. Instead of letting 
them perform the task (which we thought these children could safely be assumed all to 
be capable of), we asked them to choose between two configurations. Subjects have to 
made their decisions on the basis of anticipation. As shown in experiments by Carello, 
Grosofsky, Reichel, Solomon & Turvey (1989) people are able to anticipate actions 
depending on the constraints given for the action system. Following ecological realism, 
we assumed that perceiving an object as a tool is a task of anticipating the act of tool 
use. If this is the case, we expect judgements to correspond to the preferences and 
percentages correct in the experiments of van Leeuwen et al. (submitted), where tool 
use was actually performed. 
Theoretical preferences can be determined from the differences in complexity of the 
affordance structures involved. Accordingly, Configuration a in Figure 1 is predicted to 
be always preferred because the affordance structure involved is least complex 
compared to all remaining configurations. Configuration e is expected never to be 
preferred because the solution requires anticipation of the most complex affordance 
structure. The configurations b-d are predicted to be preferred whenever they are 
presented in combination with a more complex one. Thus, when every Configuration 
a-e is combined with each of the remaining four, the predicted percentage success for 
each configuration follows from the order in complexity between their affordance 
structures given in Experiment; see Figure 6. (E.g. Configuration b is predicted to be 
prefered three times out of four, Percentage preference thus is 75%.) 
Method 
Subjects. The experiment was run in 2 schools in the Dutch town of Breda. Fourty 
children between 6 and 7 years old, 19 girls and 21 boys, volunteered for the 
experiment 
Stimuli, material. From the five configurations shown in Figure 1, at most ten 
different pairs can be formed if the order within a pair is not considered. These pairs of 
configurations were included as stimuli in the experiment. Unlike in Experiment 1, 
where two configurations were combined, they were kept separate here. One 
configuration was presented in the left-hand position of the child and the other at the 
right hand side. The two configurations were displayed at a distance of 30 cm from 
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each other. Right and left position of a configuration in a pair were balanced across 
subjects. Also the orientation of a hook to the left or right side was balanced over 
subjects. The materials used were similar to those of Experiment 1. Targets were 
cookies. Children were standing on a flag-stone which marked the middle position. 
The whole set-up is shown in Figure 5. 
experimenter 
О 
table 
border of the 
within reach area 
Figure 5: Experimental setting used in Experiment 2 
Procedure. At first the experimenter asked: " Do you want to have a cookie?" After 
the child's response "Yes", the experimenter announced a game and started with the 
first trial. The child was asked to tum 180 degrees on the spot, so that he or she no 
longer could see the display on the table. A pair of configurations from Figure 2 was 
installed on the table. Then, the child turned back and the experimenter asked: "Can one 
of these cookies be made to come to you? For which of these two will it be easier?" 
The child chose one of the configurations by saying or pointing. The choice was 
registered by the experimenter. Ten of these trials, including all possible pairs out of 
Configurations a to e in Figure 1, were presented to a child in a random order. After the 
last trial the child was allowed to actually use the hook to get the cookie. Because the 
trials were presented in random order, the last trial was randomly selected from the ten 
possible pairs. The result of this actual attempt was also registered by the 
experimenter. Children who did not succeed in getting the cookie on their own by 
using the hook after the last trial were given one. 
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Results and discussion 
Surprisingly, 11 out of the 40 children didn't succeed in obtaining the cookie with the 
aid of the hook after the last trial. The preferences of the children who obtained the 
cookie on their own after the last trial (successful group) and those who didn't 
(unsuccessful group) are presented separately. 
Figure 6 shows the preferences of the 29 children who got the cookie on their own 
(successful group) compared to the theoretical preferences. 
% 
preference 
theoretical 
preferences 
successful 
group 
a b с d e 
Configuration 
Figure 6: Results of Experiment 2. Percentage preference for Configuration a to e as 
obtained from the theoretical description compared to the observed 
preferences for the successful group. 
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Figure 7: Results of Experiment 2. Percentages success in Configurations a-e for the 
theoretical predictions concerning the act of reaching the target without tool 
compared to the unsuccessful group. 
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As shown in Figure 6, the preferences are as predicted on the basis of differences in 
task complexity. A linear regression analysis between the estimation values of the 
successful group and our hypothetical predictions gives a prediction value of r2 = 
0.98. 
In fact, the preferences are not only highly consistent with this hypothesis averaged 
across subjects, but also the total number of violations of the hypothesis in concrete 
choices is extremely low. Out of the total number of 290 choices made by the children, 
the total number of violations is 2. We conclude that for children in the successful 
group, the differences in task complexity determines the child's preference for a 
configuration. 
In van Leeuwen et al. (submitted), we obtained percentages solution for the group of 
children 14 to 24 months old, according to: Configuration a = b > c > d > e . The lack 
of a difference between Configuration a and b, was interpreted as a ceiling effect This 
interpretation is comfirmed by the fact that Configuration a is preferred stronger than 
Configuration b compared to Configuration d or e respectively in the present 
experiment. Again, in Experiment 2 a difference is found between Configurations a 
and b according to our theoretical prediction. In view of the stability of results over 
experiments, we may interprete the difference as confirmation to our assumption of a 
ceiling effect as responsible for the lack of difference between the two configurations in 
our earlier experiment (van Leeuwen et al. submitted). 
In Figure 7, the preferences are shown of the group of 11 children who, suprisingly, 
were unable to get the cookie by using the hook after the last trial (unsuccessful group). 
Configurations b to e were equally preferred and Configuration a was never preferred. 
These preferences conform to what might be expected in reaching without tool. 
Theoretically, Configurations b to e are equal with respect to the act of reaching 
because the target is always equally far from the actor. In the case of preferences 
concerning reaching, Configuration a is theoretically never prefered. This, because the 
distance between target and child is larger in comparison with the other configurations 
(see Figure 7). 
We predicted the preferences as detrmined by the act of reaching for the target without 
tool.The prediction value from a linear regression analysis is г^ = 0.98. Children of 
the unsuccessful group failed to take the hook into account. 
There are many possible reasons why these children might act according to the reaching 
hypothesis. Children between 6 and 7 years old can safely be assumed to be able to use 
tools in this type of situation. In a more familiar configuration or after a demonstration 
they would have no problem at all in doing so. Our results may be due to the kind of 
task where children lack feedback from performing the act of tool use or due to an 
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inhibition, perhaps caused by their interpretation of the instruction as requiring them 
not to do the obvious, viz. to use the hook. With regard to our hypothesis, however, it 
is irrelevant why they refrain from doing so. Individuals prefer configurations 
according to the action anticipated, either with the tool or without it 
Results from the group using the tool for obtaining the cookie in the last trial are the 
same as for experiments with younger, successful children. So, independent of age and 
differences in task, the theoretically described task complexity seems to predict action. 
The question could be raisedwhether the same sources of complexity are relevant for 
children who are able to perform successfully in all configurations as for those who are 
in the process of learning to use tools. Its relevance lies in showing that the lower-order 
affordances children use when they are in the process of integrating their perceptions, 
are still available when the integration is completed. Lower-order affordances can be 
useful maximally efficiently if they can be embedded in a wide variety of higher-order 
affordance structures. The ability to perceive the graspability of a spoon can be useful 
in eating but also in stirring or play. If this lower-order affordance is available separate 
from the higher-order affordance structure it is embedded in, the actor may profit from 
its familiarity. Along similar lines, in Gal'perin's (1969) model of the formation of 
mental acts, mental development results from meaningful material activity. The basic 
mechanism of ontogenesis is the mechanism of intenonzation, whereby the forms of 
society transcend to the mental level of the individual (see also Vygotskij, 1986). 
Abstraction through language means that action relevant properties of an event are 
described so that they can be applied to other events varying in irrelevant properties. 
We do not agree with Gal'perin's notion that language is assumed to be the only means 
available for abstraction. The higher-order affordance structure concept assumes that 
abstract information can be perceived directly. "Gibson's crucial proposal in the theory 
of affordances is that we typically, and primarily, attend to the higher-order invariant 
information which specify what objects afford for our action, rather than the lower-
order information which specifies its isolated properties. We simply can see that a 
surface affords walking"(Costall, 1981 p.46). 
Gal'perin's claim of reconstructability of the invariant properties of a material act is 
important with respect to communication as he noted. Reconstructability is also needed 
in order to act flexibly upon changing environmental and bodily circumstances. In order 
to use relational information available flexible, lower-order affordances should be 
consciously distinguishable. Cognitive as well as motor skills are assumed to be 
integrated as subroutines or components into hierarchical organized wholes (Bruner 
1973; Fischer 1980; Werner, 1957). For the aquisition of new skills, already available, 
integrated ones, are needed. Available components or subroutines could be integrated in 
a different way into a new skill. In order to make use of them, it is neccessary to isolate 
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them from their hierarchical context. As an example, consider the task of solving 
Configuration e from Figure 1 for an adult subject. The different complementary 
relationships between tool and target to be realized are integrated into a smooth action 
by a skilled subject. Looking at the action it is difficult to isolate the different 
components. Consider the same subjects confronted with the problem to get something 
out of reach, and there is no object available to be used as a tool. The person than could 
solve the problem by making a hook. Making the hook requires explicitly the 
recognition of the components of the act because they constitute the properties of the 
potential tool. As an example, the lenght of a hook to be made must be determined by 
the distance to be covered but also from the requirement that the actor must be able to 
manipulate it. Both relationships must be recognized in order to integrate them later into 
a smooth action. 
In order to demonstrate how lower-order affordances should be integrated in new 
actions, we performed experiment 3. 
Experiment 3 
Introduction 
An important characteristic of the affordance structure concept is its relational nature 
(Heft, 1989). Perception is the result of interaction of organism and environment. 
Concretely in our experiments, perception of the tool function is assumed to result from 
an interaction between the actors goal, his biomechanica! properties and properties of 
the respective tool-target configuration. This implys that perception is not predictable 
from the environmental properties in isolation. A consequence of this view is that the 
relative difficulty of tool use configurations depend on the goal of the action. In 
Experiment 3, an attempt is made to investigate more directly the dependency of the 
perception of the configurations on the goal of the action.We try to discover whether 
the rank order in difficulty obtained in Experiments 1 and 2 could be completely turned 
over by changing the goal. The configurations used in Experiment 3 are shown in 
Figure 8. The hole in the table on which a configuration were presented is novel in 
comparison with the configurations of Figure 1. The goal now is to push the target (a 
plastic duck) with the aid of the hook into a hole in the table, in order to plunge it into a 
water-basin. In Configurations 1/2 and 5/6 the position of target and tool relative to the 
hole is such that it is possible to move the target directly towards the hole, whereas for 
Configurations 3/4 and 7/8 the position of the tool must be changed first. 
Configurations 1-4 in Figure 8 are instances of Configuration b from Experiment 1 
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and Configurations 5-8 are instances of Configuration d from Experiment 1. Mirror 
images of every configuration are included (Configurations 2,4,6,8). 
According to the results of Experiments land 2, Configuration b was easier than 
Configuration d. This is expected to be overthrown by the new goal. Table 3 shows 
that different instances of Configurations b and d may have become equal in difficulty, 
if their affordance structures related to the new goal are similar in complexity. This is 
the case for Configurations 1/2 and 5/6 compared to Configurations 3/4 and 7/8 
respectively. On the other hand, differences in difficulty are expected among different 
instances of Configuration b due to the changed affordance structure related to the new 
goal. This is the case, between Configurations 1/2 and 3/4, where the latter is more 
difficult Likewise for the variations of Configuration d, where Configurations 5/6 may 
be expected to be easier than Configurations 7/8. 
Table 3: Theoretical predictions of relative differences in percentages success for 
Configurations 1-8 with respect to Experiments 1 and 2. 
Experiments 1/2 Experiment 3 
Configuration 1/2 = 3/4 1/2 > 3/4 
Configuration 1/2 > 5/6 1Д = 5/6 
Configuration 5/6 = 7/8 5/6 > 7/8 
Configuration 3/4 > 7/8 3/4 = 7/8 
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Figure 8: Tool use configurations of Experiment 3 
Method 
Subjects. The experiment was run in three child day-care centers in the Dutch towns 
Nijmegen and Wijchen. Twenty-nine children between 17 and 32 months old(16 males 
and 13 females) volunteered with their parents' consent. 
Material. The same plastic hooks as in the former experiments were used. The target 
objects were three plastic ducks, each of a different colour, about 10 cm in diameter 
and about 4 cm in height The table used for the presentation of the configurations was 
70 cm in hight. Part of the surface of the table consisted of a disk, 70 cm in diameter 
(see Figure 9) which could be rotated by the experimenter. Within the disk there was a 
circular gap of 12 cm in diameter. Under the table a basin filled with water was placed, 
in which the duck plunged whenever it fell through the hole. 
border of the within reach area 
Í J experimenter 
table 
Figure 9: Experimental setting used in Experiment 3. 
Stimuli. Every subject was presented with 4 configurations, one out of Configuration 
1/2, one out of Configuration 3/4, one out of Configuration 5/6, one out of 
Configuration 7/8. The configurations were chosen in such a manner that every subject 
Child 
О 
100 
received an equal numbers of configurations with the hole on the left as on the right of 
tool and target The order of conngurations chosen was randomized over subjects. 
Procedure. The experiment consisted of two phases. Phase one was a familiarization 
phase. The child came into the experimental room with the nurse or mother. Mother or 
nurse sat down in front of the table with the child on her lap. For about two minutes the 
hook was given to the child in order to explore it. Even so the three ducks were given 
to the child for a short time. Then, a nonexperimental Configuration was presented 
(Configuration a from Figure 1) and the nurse (or mother) performed the act of pushing 
the duck into the gap with the aid of the hook. Then the child was shown the 
swimming duck in the basin and he or she was asked if he would help the other ducks 
to come into the water. If the child agreed, phase two was started. The nurse or mother 
was asked to prevent the child from climbing on the table or walking around the table in 
order to put the duck by his or her own hands into the gap. Further she was instructed 
to behave neutral with respect to the tasks. Four different configurations were 
subsequently presented to the child. If a child didn't succeed in performing the task 
after trying four times, the training configuration was presented in order for the child to 
regain motivation. After each trial, the child was allowed to look at the duck in the 
basin. 
Results and discussion 
Within-group differences in success for Configurations 1-8 were tested with the Mc-
Nemar chi-square procedure (see Table 4). 
As shown in Table 4, the relative percentages of success for the different 
configurations are in accordance with our hypotheses. The frequencies of correct 
solution showed no effect of trial number, indicating the absence of an effect of 
practice. The difference between left and right orientated mirror image configurations 
was significant only for Configuration 3/4 (t27 = 2.687, ρ = .019). More correct 
solutions were obtained with the target at the right-hand. 
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Table 4: Results of Experiment 3. 
expected relation observed relation chi-square significance 
between Configurations between % success level 
of these Configurations 
1;2 = 5;6 100% =96.6% 1.00 n.s. 
3;4 = 7;8 72% = 82.8% 3.00 n.s. 
1;2>3;4 100% > 72% 8.00 0.05 
5;6>7;8 96.6% > 82.8% 4.00 0.05 
Note. Significances with the McNemar chi-square Test; n.s. = not significant; ρ for 
chi-square 3.48, df = 1, alpha = .05, one-tailed test; η = 29. 
The results support our claim that the relative difficulty of tool-use configurations 
cannot be explained from the tool-target relationship in isolation. The tool-target 
relationship has different action implications within the context of different goals. 
Examples from the literature 
In oder to test the general validly of our concept we have to apply the description to a 
wider range of tasks. We searched the literature for tasks that like tool use manifest 
themselves in manipulative action, and are concerned with relating more than one 
object to the actor and to each other. This, because in our view a broad underlying 
tendency could be observed in the transition to these forms of action during the second 
year of life. A prerequisite for this claim is, that our approach applies to these forms of 
action. 
Richardson (1932) investigated in detail what determines the difficulty of a tool-use 
configuration in infants aged from 28 to 52 weeks. Inspired by Köhler (1917) she used 
several tool-use configurations like the ones shown in Figure 10 in which there are a 
lure out of reach, with a string attached to it, and also two loose strings. The task is to 
obtain the lure by pulling the proper string. The observed difficulty of pulling the 
proper string increases from Configurations A to В and from В to С Richardson 
points out that "The relative difficulty appears to depend,..., on the directness with 
which the loose strings lead toward the lure" (p.311). This explanation holds only for 
the difference between Configurations A and С and the difference between 
Configurations В and C, but not for the difference between Configurations A and B. 
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Figure 10: Configurations used by Richardson (1932) 
In terms of our theoretical description the differences between Configurations A, В and 
С would have to be explainable from the differences in complexity of the affordance 
structures involved. Intuitively, Configuration A is easier than Configuration B. This 
is in accordance with our description. In Configuration A, String 3 is ready for pulling 
towards the child (downwards in the picture), whereas the string must be brought in 
the appropriate orientation first in Configuration B. As compared to Configuration A 
Configuration В is more difficult. This is so because the number of complementary 
relationships between actor tool and target to be anticipated is increased compared to 
Configuration A. The same holds for Configuration С if we consider the attached string 
in isolation, apart from the solutions suggested by the detached strings. In 
Configurations A and В the detached strings don't suggest different solutions. 
However, in Configuration C, which is still more difficult than Configuration В this is 
the case (see Table 3). String 2 in Configuration С suggests the easier solution from 
only vertical pulling whereas in Configuration В there isn't such a suggestion. Because 
we assume that less complex solutions will be preferred by an actor we would predict 
the probability of pulling the wrong string in Configuration С as higher as compared to 
Configuration B. The misleading String 2 in Configuration С suggests a more direct 
solution as compared to the attached String 3. This illustrates that the probability of 
wrong choices is determined by the interrelationship of concurrent complementary 
relationships between actor, string and target suggested in a configuration. We agree 
with Richardson's expression that relative difficulty of Tasks А, В and С depend on 
\ 
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the relationship between attached and detached strings. However, preferences must be 
predicted on the basis of differences in implied action consequences and not on the 
basis of string-target relations undependently from action. Without including action 
consequences, it is not clear why Configurations A and В differ in difficulty. 
Table 5: Number of lower-order affordances to be integrated in order to realize the 
three suggested solutions for tool-use configurations A,B and С from 
Richardson (1932) respectively. 
Configuration String 
1 2 3 
A 1 1 1 
В 2 2 2 
С 2 1 2 
В 
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crook 
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Figure 11: Tool use configurations according to Bates et al. (1980). 
Köhler (1917) obtained a promising result in his experiments: a gap perceived between 
tool (a stick) and target (a banana out of reach) makes it difficult for these animals to 
"see" the function of the tool. Only after extended practice will the chimps perform this 
task whereas they do so spontaneously in the case of spatial contact between tool and 
target Bates, Carlson-Luden & Bretherton (1980) have performed similar experiments 
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with human infants and obtained comparable results. These authors have shown that 
babies between 40 and 44 weeks begin to perform tool-use tasks. They compared eight 
tool-use configurations in which a toy must be obtained with the aid of a tool (see 
Figure 11). Children perform best if the toy and the tool are attached (either a toy lying 
on a cloth or a toy with a string attached to it); a somewhat lower performance level is 
reached if the tool (a hoop or a hook ) and the toy are in loose contact with each other, 
performance is worse if toy and tool are not in contact. Though the research of both 
Bates et al. (1980) and Köhler (1917) show the importance of spatial contact, they 
weren't able to clarify its precise role. Our experiments show that spatial contact is not 
helpful as such. Only if the spatial contact is needed for realizing the tool function does 
it facilitate the solution. From our theoretical description of affordance structures, we 
can now see why cloth and string attached are the easiest cases. These are the ones in 
which the relation between tool and target needed for the solution, is already realized. 
Moreover, the realization is safe against disturbance. Provided that too erratic 
movements are excluded, the actor actually should not be aware of the tool-target 
relationship and treat the cloth or the string as just a part of the target. We might call 
tool-use trivialized, here. Children developing their skills may begin to use tools in 
such trivial cases, extending their skills to the more difficult ones, requiring more 
specifity. Probably, the next step would than be the case of loose contact between 
crook or hoop and target. Also here, the required tool-target relationship is already 
realized, but it must be maintained so that the target follows a movement of the tool 
towards the child. Compared to the string/cloth example, the kind of the particular tool-
target relationship must be recognized in order to anticipate a successful action. The 
necessity to control this relationship in action makes the affordance structure involved 
more complex. In the case of loose contact between target and crook or hoop, the 
required contact between tool and target at the right place must be anticipated. In the 
last example tools and target are completely detached so that the relationship of the two 
must be anticipated completely. The existence of such changes in complexity of 
affordance structures involved shows that developing tool use may be due to increasing 
perceptual differentiation. In the so called trivialized cases an actor doesn't need to 
differentiate the relational properties of tool and target in relation to an possible action. 
Demands on specifity and with it embeddedness of relational properties increase with 
increasing difficulty of tool-use configurations. 
Summarizing, with the assumption of affordance structures it is possible to describe the 
increasing complexity of the tasks used by Bates et al. (1980). In these terms the role 
of spatial contact as embedded in action can be described explicitly. 
Our reinterpretation of the results of Bates suggests that children seem to solve tasks 
involving less complex affordance structures earlier in development than the more 
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complex ones. The examples given are reduced to tool use tasks for bringing 
something within reach. In order to explore if development of action may be 
characterized more generally by increasing complexity of the affordance structures 
involved, we analysed other kinds of manipulative actions. We used wellknown 
examples of actions that are described in the ordinal scales of psychological 
development in infancy by Uzgiris & Hunt (1975) as characteristic for cognitive 
development at certain stages. We will discuss whether the ordering corresponds to the 
one that could be obtained according to complexity with the aid of our criteria. In this 
manner, our description could be a diagnostic tool for characterizing infants and young 
childrens' cognitive development. The instrument used by Uzgiris & Hunt's (1975), 
and most, or all other diagnostic instruments are based on empirical criteria of what a 
child of a certain age is supposed to do, or know. 
In some cases, the ordering of difficulty might seem obvious. Consider the following 
task: a mechanical toy car must be activated by winding it up by means of a key. The 
act of winding is modeled by an adult person. After playing, the child wants to 
reactivate the toy once more. Children 9 to 12 months of age solve this problem by a 
request for direct action on another person. The quite simple manipulatory action of 
handing the toy to another person is a substitute for the manipulatively quite complex 
action of winding the toy themselves. The younger children could therefore be said to 
use the mother as a tool. However, they do not need any detailed insight in how the 
"mother-tool" relates to toy and key. The action of giving is enough to realize the 
intended goal, to obtain a functioning toy. 
Children 18 to 22 month of age attempt to activate the toy by using the key as tool. 
How they can handle the key depends on how it is grasped. But as a consequence of 
how the key is intended to function, further constraints on action follow from the 
relational mechanical properties of key and lock. These constraints, as well as 
additional ones resulting from their combination must be met in order for the child to 
reach the goal. 
The preceding description can straightforwardly be translated into an outline of the 
complementary relationships involved between child, toy and mother for the younger 
children and between child, toy and key for the older ones. This may already suffice to 
illustrate the difference in complexity between the affordance structures involved in the 
actions of the younger and thpse of the older ones (see Figure 12). 
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9-13 months: 
18-22 months: 
toy <: ;> hand ^ » toy < > mother 
• < — ^ " to-ver-oider affoidance/complementniity 
higher-older effordance 
Figure 12: Affordance structures involved in different ways for getting a mechanical 
toy car activated at the ages of 9-13 months and 18-22 months 
respectively. 
But also in somewhat less obvious cases, our discription might be put to work: 9-12 
months old children are able to put small objects into clearly wider containers. But they 
fail in form board tasks were an object must be fit to a narrow opening of the same 
shape. Yet, both these actions realize a containment relation. Differences become 
visible only by analyzing the complementary relationships between the respective 
elements of the action. 
In the case of a little object into a big container, the action is constrained by the global 
size relationship. The act of grasping the object is not constrainted by the act of putting 
the object into the container. In order to solve this problem, a sequence of actions must 
be anticipated (in our words, a diachronous integrated affordance structure must be 
perceived): first the actor-object relationship of grasping must be realized; second the 
object must be transported towards the container; and third the object must be put into 
the container. For this, the object must be above the container, no matter in which 
orientation. 
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By contrast, in the case of the form board, exact adjustment of the object's orientation 
to the shape of the opening is required. This means that there is much more, 
synchronous, temporal integration in the affordance structure. The act of orienting the 
object is constrained by the symmetry axes of the shape.The number of ways could 
vary, in which in the last stage of the action the adjustment of the shape's orientation 
could be realized. The alternative ways to do this increase with the number of 
symmetry axes of the shape. Thus the simplicity of the shape, in terms of symmetry 
axes, relaxes the constraints on the planning and anticipation of the task. Therefore, the 
task will be easier if the object and the opening are more symmetric. In this way fitting 
a ball into the opening of the formboard is much easier than fitting a bar to the 
respective opening. In terms of affordance structures this means the following: 
anticipating the act of orienting the object consists of more complementary relationships 
between specific properties of the object and specific properties of the grasping system 
if there are less symmetry axes. See Figure 13 for a comparison of the integration 
demands of fitting a small object to a large container and one example for a form board 
task concerning a bar as object 
9-12 months: 
hand •^ —5»-object ^ • object < > container 
18-22 months: 
hand bar in vidth« 
4 ^ 
bar in height <1 "> opening 
opening 
• < — ^ " lover-order affoidence/complementBiity 
higher-order affordance 
Figure 13: Affordance structure involved in fitting a small object to a big container 
and a form board task performed by children of 9-13 months and 18-22 
months respectively. 
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Complexity of affordance structures involved in solving the manipulative tasks 
mentioned seems to provide predictions of their relative difficulty. Development in 
manipulation of objects can be described in terms of increasing differentiation of 
relational properties of actor and different objects and their embedding in action. 
General Discussion 
In our earlier work, a description of higher-order structures of complementary 
relationships that could exist between actor and environment (affordance structures) 
was proposed. These must be perceived in order to realize complex forms of action 
such as tool use. Theoretical sources of complexity were proposed. These regard the 
nature of the temporal and structural integration demands of the affordance structure; 
the way different complementary relationships between actor and environment are 
joined together. The observed difficulty of our tasks corresponds to these sources 
combined. 
Our present experiments show that the consequences of affordance structure 
complexity are consistent over age groups and tasks. With respect to age groups, the 
older groups are able to deal with more complex affordance structures than the younger 
ones. But more importantly, the complexity of the affordance structures determines not 
only the behaviour of the younger children, who are in the process of learning to use 
tools. But the complexity is also mirrored in the behaviour of the older ones. Whereas 
for the younger children higher integration demands lead to failure to perform the task, 
the older ones prefer a mode of performance that requires a less complex affordance 
structure. 
It was illustrated in our experiments that the complexity of affordance structures could 
be used successfully to predict the preferred realizations for different tasks. From an 
analysis of different manipulative tasks we argued for the ecological validity of these 
concepts. The tasks younger children are able to perform in our terms are less complex 
than the ones only older children can do. A possible application could be a diagnostic 
instrument for characterizing infants and young childrens' perceptive/cognitive 
development. At present, many diagnostic instruments are selected by means of 
empirical criteria of what a child of a certain age is supposed to do, or know. We might 
now be able to develop criteria to determine why certain tasks work well as diagnotiscs 
and others don't, and therefore ultimately to systematically devise certain tasks. 
In our analyses, we have implicitly assumed that our description could be applied for 
different response measures. Although we have provided no direct evidence for this 
assumption, the general applicability of our theoretical description might be taken as 
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indirect evidence for it. We may therefore propose our higher-order affordance 
structure concept as a means to analyze possible forms of action according to their 
complexity. 
The validity of our description accross age groups and tasks suggests that development 
in a perception-action perspective could be described by means of affordance 
structures. Development then would be characterized by the ability to deal with 
affordance structures of increasing complexity. This view corresponds to the notion of 
development as a process of differentiation as e.g. expressed by Werner (1957) or in 
the field of perceptual development by E. Gibson (1988). She points out that 
"progressive differentiation results in increasing specifity of correspondence of 
perception with sources of stimulation in the environment" p.4. "Perceptual 
development seems to proceed toward finer differentiation of embedding in events and 
at the same time progressive realization of superordinate relations" p. 17. The 
emergence of tool use during the second year of life is, in these terms, the result of a 
more general ability to perform nested actions subservient to a superordinate goal. In 
order to discover tool functions, properties of objects are to be differentiated specific to 
actor and target. Our description provides an account of what kind of embedded 
structures are to be perceived in order to do this. The increasing specifity of the 
perception-action couplings needed to act efficiently is expressed in terms of mutual 
constraining affordances, i.e. in terms of embedding. 
Our approach fits attempts to characterize growth e.g. (van Geert, 1991) and 
development (Thelen, Kelso & Skala, 1987) in terms of a self-organizing dynamic 
systems. An interesting property of the behaviour of many dynamic systems is their so-
called scale invariance; the emergent properties of the system at micro level are similar 
to those on macro level. This means that for the analysis, the elements are arbitrary. In 
our tool use task the elements were the grasping system as a whole, a tool and a toy. 
We assumed that this perception/action repertoire was already available to the child. 
Children actually perform these movements. If the movements themselves are the focus 
of analysis, a finer grain of description becomes necessary. On the next finer grain the 
elements could be individual joints and limbs of the actor, and similarly detailed 
components of tool and target. The next coarser grain of analysis to the present one 
could be the social interaction, described in terms of verbal and non verbal 
communication during task performance. Also here it is possible to describe 
affordances of different actors, tool and target and their interaction. Which level(s) of 
description are chosen depends on the focus of research. 
We must take care, however, not to confuse our description with a theory of 
development. The principles that drive the increasing differentiation, in our terms, are 
still unspecified. In order to discover those principles, the description should be used in 
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a dialectical approach to development In such an approach developmental outcomes aie 
treated as dynamic interaction between different dimensions from biological up to 
cultural-historical level. Conflict within and between those dimensions are assumed to 
be the source of development (see Hopkins & Butterworth, 1990, p.21). Because the 
complexity measure of affordance structures is not specific to task or age, our 
description could provide an instrument for describing action on different levels as 
respective organism environment relationships. Given that the validity of our concept 
could be established more firmly than possible in the context of this paper.the 
description of affordance structures could be a possible instrument to set a step in 
realizing the claim of Hopkins & Butterworth " to define the critical aspects of the 
organism-environment relationship that are important at different points in 
development" (p.27). 
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Epilogue 
The existence and use of tools is a product of environmental circumstances and action 
combined. Therefore the branches of science that deal with environment or action 
should develop a common language to approach the problem of the relation between 
them. The emergence of tool use cannot be studied from a psychological point of view 
exclusively, but neither can it be excluded. The value of the present, psychological, 
description of tool use in terms of affordance structures should be assessed in the 
context of other disciplines like ethology, archeology and cultural anthropology. 
Psychologists could provide e.g. for archeologists a criterion for what type of 
environmental structures possess significance for a certain action. Man-made tools thus 
could be classified according to complexity of their affordance structures. Since the 
complexity could be taken as a measure of human development, archeologists could use 
this measure for the same purpose on a filogenetic scale. 
Ethologists have argued that tool use is all but exclusively reserved for humans. In their 
view, not only our direct ancestors, the prehuman primates, but even invertebrates, 
fishes, birds and other animals are able to use, or even manufacture tools (Beck, 1980). 
One could argue that this is a matter of definition. This makes sense, as there is no 
generally agreed-upon definition of the concept of tool. Therefore, there is no 
theoretical criterion for distinguishing tool use from other forms of action. The 
psychology of tool use could provide a diagnosis. It could be proposed to distinguish 
actions according to their complexity, in terms of their affordance structure. It may tum 
out that instance of tool use are found to be dispersed over a wide range of complexity. 
This may cast doubts on efforts to obtain a single, satisfactory definition that covers all 
possible instances. 
In the preceding chapters, an attempt was made to contribute to the ecological approach 
to perception, a demonstration of how complex action could be dealt with in this 
framework. The application of the affoidance structure concept to a broader range of 
actions could its relevance for perceptual development. Therefore, a future task would 
be to apply the concept to actions that precede, accompany and follow tool use. An 
application seems possible to manipulative tasks that contain less complex affordance 
structures than tool use, e.g. those which encompass relations of containment or 
support between objects. Instances of such tasks are putting things into a container or 
building a tower. 
A comparison of the tool use actions with those of similar complexity in other domains 
such as exploration, social interaction and speech would be of interest. For an 
Epilogue 115 
illuminating survey, see Greenfield (1991). In her view, like ours, these actions have in 
common a requirement for integration of a hierarchical structure of events. 
Manipulative actions that require affordance structures of higher complexity than tool 
use are e.g. those of tool making. An object must be transformed into a tool before it 
can be used This requires a principally deeper nesting of actions than just for tool use. 
In sum, the study of tool use from a psychological point of view could provide insights 
in the development of perception as well as in the nature of tools. The present work 
provides a challenge rather than a task fulfilled, for me and, I hope, for others as well. 
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Summary 
In order to bring tool use within the scope of ecological realism, it was necessary to 
deal with some conceptual issues of ecological realism first. Whereas ecological realism 
takes body-scaled infonnation as its starting point, in the case of tool use object-scaled 
information has to be considered as well. In order to perceive the function of a tool and 
to realize its function in an action, the proportions and mechanical characteristics of the 
tool have to be viewed in reference to the actor and to the object(s) which are the target 
of the action. A skrewdriver, which has both an object-scaled and a body-scaled ending 
may serve as illustration. In the ecological approach until now, body-scaled information 
belongs to the affordance concept, which has an intimate relation to action. Object-
scaled information was studied in the context of event perception in which the perceiver 
has the role of an observer. For tool use, object-scaled information has to be 
incorporated in action. Action becomes an actor-involving event. Thus thee study of 
tool use required closure of the gap between event perception and action. 
Another distinctive aspect of tools is that they are a means to an end. Their function is 
subordinated to the goal of the action. The subordination has a structural and a 
temporal aspect. Structurally, the to be realized actor-target relation prescribes the 
required actor-tool complementarities. Affordances of tools contain a nested structure 
of complementary relationships between actor and environment and between objects in 
the environment. In order to realize the goal of the action, however, these 
complementarities must be placed in an appropriate temporal organization. Whatever 
has to be realized first is subordinated to the goal which is realized last. Therefore an 
actor on a global level has to envisage the event in its entirity. 
Tools provide an empirical reference point in the issue of relationalism versus realism 
for the ecological approach. Realism requires a fully determined world in which 
affordances exist as objectively given entities that cannot be changed by a perceiver's 
intentions. Tool artefacts, however, are a clear example for how the affordances of the 
environment can be changed. Tools extend both, the environmental resources to be 
used in action, and the action capacities of those who use them. Relationalism allows 
the study of how organism and environment co-develop. Therefore preference was 
given to an exclusively relational approach of tool use. 
In order to describe how body-scaled and object-scaled infonnation are integrated in 
perception, the notion of higher-order structures of complementary relationships was 
introduced (affordance structures). These are perceived in order to realize complex 
forms of action such as tool use. Affordance structures vary in complexity. Two 
sources of complexity were identified, corresponding to the earlier mentioned structural 
and temporal integration demands, respectively. The complexity was assumed to be a 
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determinant of the difficulty of tool use tasks. To test this prediction, a variety of tasks 
was employed, all of which resembled Köhler's (1921) paradigm. In his experiments, 
a chimpanzee had to use a stick as tool in order to obtain a banana. In the experiments 
presendy discussed, the stick is replaced by a hook (though it sometimes was used as a 
stick), the banana by a desirable toy, and the chimpanzee by a young child. We varied 
the relative spatial positions of the tool and target to obtain tool affordances of different 
complexity. Also, task, instruction and children's age was varied. The observed 
difficulty of our tasks agreed well with the predictions. 
In follow-up studies, the effect of affordance structure complexity was consistent over 
age groups and tasks. With respect to age groups, the older groups were able to deal 
with more complex affordance structures than the younger ones. But more importantly, 
the complexity of the affordance structures determined not only the behaviour of the 
younger children, who are in the process of learning to use tools. Also the older ones 
were influenced by the complexity. Whereas for the younger children higher 
complexity lead to failure to perform the task, the older ones preferred a mode of 
performance that requires a less complex affordance structure. It was illustrated by ал 
analysis of different manipulative tasks that generally, younger children are able to 
perform possess less complex tasks than older ones. On this basis the ecological 
validity of these concepts was argued for. 
The validity of our description accross age groups and tasks candidates it for an account 
of development in a perception-action perspective. Development then would be 
characterized by the ability to deal with affordance structures of increasing complexity. 
This view is in accordance with the notion of development as a process of 
differentiation as e.g. expressed by Wemer (1957), or by E. Gibson (1988) in the 
field of perceptual development The emergence of tool use during the second year of 
life is, in these terms, the result of a more general ability to perform nested actions 
subservient to a subordinate goal. In order to discover tool functions, properties of 
objects are to be differentiated specific to actor (body-scaled information) and target 
(object-scaled information). Our description provides an account of what kind of 
embedded structures are to be perceived in order to perform nested actions. 
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Om werktuiggebruik vanuit het perspectief van het ecologisch realisme te kunnen 
benaderen, moesten allereerst de uitgangspunten van deze benadering aan een kritisch 
onderzoek worden onderworpen. Dit betreft de aanname dat hetgeen in de omgeving 
van een actor van belang kan zijn, in relatie moet worden gezien met proporties en 
dimensies van de actor zelf. Echter, bij werktuiggebruik spelen eveneens de relatieve 
proportie en dimensionering van voorwerpen onderling een rol. Een werktuiggebruiker 
moet zowel letten op de relatie tot het eigen lichaam, als op die van de voorwerpen 
onderling. Ter illustratie: één van de uiteinden van een schroevendraaier heeft een 
proportie die complementair is t.o.v. de actor (het handvat); de ander een proportie die 
hem complementair maakt t.o.v. de schroef. 
In het ecologisch realisme is de relatie tot het lichaam ondergebracht in het concept 
affordance. Een affordance heeft een directe betrekking tot mogelijke actie. De relaties 
van objecten tot elkaar wordt binnen het ecologisch realisme onderzocht binnen het 
domein van de waarneming van gebeurtenissen. Maar hierin heeft de de waarnemer 
slechts de rol van toeschouwer. Bij werktuiggebruik moet deze soort van informatie 
gekoppeld worden aan de mogelijkheid tot actie. Daarom moet het onderzoek naar 
werktuiggebruik de kloof overbruggen tussen de waarneming van gebeurtenissen en 
actieve participatie hieraan. 
Een andere distinctieve eigenschap van werktuigen is, dat zij middel tot een doel zijn. 
Hun functie wordt bepaald door het doel van de handeling. Relaties tussen actor en 
werktuig en tusssen doelobject en werktuig staan ten dienste van de mogelijkheid van 
een relatie tussen actes- en doelobject. Deze ondergeschikteid heeft zowel structurele als 
temporele aspecten. Wat het structurele betreft, de gewenste relatie tusen actor en 
doelobject legt vast welke relaties tussen werktuig en actor, alsmede tussen werktuig en 
doelobject van belang zijn. Maar om het doel te realizeren, moeten deze tevens in een 
adequate temporele organisatie worden geplaatst. Wat als eerste moet worden 
uitgevoerd, is ondergeschikt aan een doel dat pas als laatste wordt gerealiseerd. Daarom 
moet de actor de handeling van tevoren globaal kunnen overzien. 
Werktuigen zorgen voor een empirische inbreng in de discussie betreffende 
relationalisme versus realisme binnen de ecologische benadering. Realisme 
veronderstelt een kant en klare wereld, waarin de affordances bestaan, onafhankelijk 
van het doen en laten van de waarnemer. Maar het ontstaan van werktuiggebruik zorgt 
juist voor uitbreiding, zowel van de aanwezige mogelijkheden van de omgeving, als 
van de handelingscapaciteit van de gebruiker. Relationalisme maakt het mogelijk de 
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ontwikkeling van individu en omgeving in hun samenhang te bestuderen. Daarom werd 
in deze studie de voorkeur gegeven aan een relationele aanpak. 
Om te beschrijven hoe de waarneming de integratie aanbrengt tussen aan het lichaam en 
aan andere objecten gerelateerde informatie hebben wij het begrip van een hogere-orde 
structuur van complementaire relaties ingevoerd, de zg. affordance-structuur. 
Affordance structuren dienen te worden waargenomen ten behoeve van complexe 
handelingen, zoals werktuiggebruik. Affordance-structuren variëren in complexiteit. 
Twee bronnen van complexiteit werden geidenünceerd, samenhangend met de eerder 
genoemde structurele- en temporele integratie aspecten. De complexiteit wordt gezien 
als een factor die de moeilijkheidsgraad van werktuiggebruik bepaalt 
Om deze voorspelling te testen is een aantal werktuigtaken ontwikkeld, die gebaseerd 
zijn op Köhlers (1921) aanpak. In zijn experimenten moesten chimpansees een banaan 
binnen handbereik halen met behulp van een stok. In de onderhavige experimenten is 
de stok vervangen door een haak (die trouwens soms als stok weid gebruikt), de 
banaan als doelobject door een gewenst speelgoed, en de aap door een jong kind. De 
positie van de haak ten opzichte van het doelobject werd systematisch gevarieerd om 
affordance structuren van verschillende complexiteit te verkrijgen. Taak, instructie en 
leeftijd werden eveneens gevarieerd. 
De geobserveerde moeilijkheid van de taken kwam goed overeen met de voorspelde. 
Complexiteit van een affordance structuur heeft een consistent effect over verschillende 
taken en leeftijden. Oudere kinderen kunnen complexere structuren aan dan jongere. 
Maar wellicht belangrijker is, dat de complexiteit van deze structuren niet alleen het 
gedrag van de jongere kinderen beïnvloedde, maar ook dat van de ouderen. Waar bij 
jongere kinderen een complexe affordance structuur tot meer fouten leidt, leidt dit bij 
oudere kinderen tot een een geringe preferentie voor de betreffende handeling. 
Een analyse van verschillende manipulatieve taken liet zien, dat de volgorde waarin 
kinderen deze taken leren afhankelijk is van de complexiteit van de affordance-
structuren. Hierop berust de ecologische validiteit van dit onderzoek. 
De validiteit van onze beschrijvingswijze over verschillende leeftijdsgroepen en taken 
suggereert dat hiermee ontwikkeling kan worden beschreven in een perceptie-actie 
perspectief. Ontwikkeling zou aldus worden gekarakteriseerd als toename in de 
complexiteit van de waargenomen affordance-structuren. Deze opvatting stemt overeen 
met die van Werner (1957) of met die van E. Gibson (1988) in het domein van 
perceptieve ontwikkeling. De opkomst van werktuiggebruik in het tweede levensjaar is, 
in deze termen, het gevolg van een meer algemene vaardigheid tot het hierarchisch 
struktureren van handelingen ten dienste van een overkoepelend doel. Om 
werktuigfuncties visueel te detecteren moeten eigenschappen specifiek voor de actor-
werktuig en de weiktuig-doelobject relatie worden samengebracht ten dienste van een 
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actor-doel relatíe. Onze beschnjvingswijze levert een middel om te laten zien, hoe 
dergelijke geneste relaties ten dienste staan van evenzeer geneste handelingen. 
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